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ABSTRACT 
 In this thesis, I demonstrate that the ability of a peace enforcement operation to 
deter spoilers determines the progress of a political settlement to a conflict.  Using the 
method of difference, I examine how two case studies with similar security environments 
obtained divergent results in political settlements to their respective conflicts.  In 
Somalia, Operation Restore Hope provided a strong peace enforcement operation, but 
ultimately failed to deter spoilers to United Nations negotiations for a political settlement 
to the conflict.  In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Operation Artemis succeeded in 
deterring spoilers to the implementation of a political settlement to that country’s civil 
war.  Peace enforcement operations like Artemis, which offer highly credible military 
capabilities in direct support of the political negotiating process, prove to be effective in 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. CIVIL WAR IN AFRICA  
 At the end of the Cold War, the global powers decided that sub-Saharan Africa 
was of waning strategic significance to the West.  There was no longer a reason to wage 
proxy wars against Communism in Africa.  Africa was no longer a security threat, but 
rather a wide-scale development project, and thus required economic rather than military 
aid.  As the post-Cold War era progressed, however, Western nations came to grips with 
the fact that developmental projects in Africa were jeopardized by political instability and 
related outbreaks of civil war.  Escalating conflicts led to dramatic humanitarian disasters 
and genocide, which spurred Western public demand for intervention to end the violence.  
Not wanting to risk their own troops, Western governments embarked on a strategy of 
supporting the development of African military forces that would deal with any emerging 
conflicts – the so-called “African solutions for African problems” strategy. 
 Unfortunately, several conflicts have evolved over the last decade, raising 
questions about whether African peacekeeping forces can adequately deal with such 
conflicts.  Sierra Leone, Liberia, Darfur, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) are some examples of crises that African regional organizations could not solve 
by themselves.  To begin with, the states supporting African organizations were not 
always willing or able to provide forces for peace support operations in a given conflict.  
Then, if forces were provided, they were not capable of resolving the conflict.  To this 
day, African forces still suffer from a variety of political and military shortfalls.  The 
West, on the other hand, has capable forces but suffers from political aversion to 
intervening in African conflicts.  Above all, Western intervention often lacks legitimacy 
in the eyes of the combatants.  Clearly, African forces cannot go it alone; but, at the same 
time, Western forces cannot arbitrarily intervene without local support. 
 These conflicts impact the lives of millions of Africans, resulting in high death 
tolls, numerous refugees, and enduring economic stagnation.  Without mechanisms for 
successfully resolving these conflicts, they will continue to spread and destabilize the 
continent.  Development efforts cannot gain purchase in such an environment.  If the 
West wants to meet its objectives in Africa, most importantly democracy and 
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development, it must address the question of when and how it should contribute its own 
military forces to stabilizing conflict situations.  If it does not, emerging conflicts in 
Africa run the risk of producing more Somalias: humanitarian disasters that devolve into 
complete statelessness and unchecked violence. 
 Given the limitations of both the African and Western mechanisms for conflict 
resolution, is there a format for intervention that could be more successful?  Where, along 
the spectrum of peace support operations, should Western forces involve themselves in 
African conflicts?  In this thesis, I will examine recent evolutions in Western-led peace 
enforcement operations in Africa and explore how they can best be utilized for sustained 
conflict resolution.  
B. THE WESTERN RESPONSE 
 As there is a long history of Western interventions in African affairs, most of it 
colonial or neo-colonial, a large portion of existing literature deals with the foreign 
policies behind recent Western interventions.  There is a broad consensus amongst 
academics that the foreign policies of Western states have been converging since the 
1990s.  Cold War-style proxy support gave way to humanitarian-motivated intervention 
in the early 1990s.  Then, after the Somalia massacre in 1993, the U.S. in particular 
backed away from direct military intervention in Africa.1  France, the most heavily 
involved in Africa, began to steer away from high-handed tactics designed to keep its 
client governments in power in Africa (i.e., counter-coup military actions).2  Throughout 
the 1990s, Western states increased their economic focus and decreased their military 
involvement.  After widespread condemnation for allowing the Rwandan genocide to 
occur, Western states realized that they could not remain completely detached from 
intervention – but they sought a less risky form of involvement in African crises. 
 Thus, in the latter half of the 1990s, the focus of the intervention debate shifted to 
the more indirect and less expensive option of developing African peacekeeping 
                                                 
1 Donald Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” SAIS Review 11, no. 1 (Winter-
Spring 2001): 190-191. 
2 Asteris C. Huliaras, “The ‘Anglosaxon Conspiracy:’ French Perceptions of the Great Lakes Crisis,” 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 4 (December 1998): 606-8; Tony Chafer, “France and 
Senegal: The End of the Affair?”  SAIS Review 23, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2003): 165-6. 
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capabilities.3  Western states would train and equip peacekeepers under African regional 
and sub-regional security organizations to handle crises within the continent.  Despite 
these efforts, Western-supported sub-regional interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
failed, leading to massive United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions accompanied by 
direct UK and U.S. intervention.  In other countries, UN ceasefire monitoring missions 
could only report that insurgent groups continued to fight, despite UN-brokered peace 
agreements.  In the DRC, there was no sub-regional intervention force on hand to help 
the UN maintain the conflict resolution process. 
 One of these cases is recognized as an example of successful Western 
intervention: the European Union’s (EU) Operation Artemis in 2003.  In the DRC, the 
UN Mission in Congo (MONUC) forces monitoring a ceasefire arrangement between 
various rebel groups and government forces were insufficient to prevent rebels from 
continuing to kill civilians caught in their struggles for territory in the eastern province of 
Ituri.  The UN was unable to reinforce its mission in eastern DRC, and the lack of a sub-
regional partner forced the UN to appeal to the international community for assistance in 
May 2003.4  The EU rapidly deployed forces under Operation Artemis in June 2003, 
preventing the further slaughter of the inhabitants of the eastern town of Bunia and 
allowing the conflict resolution process begun by the UN to resume.5  The EU’s quick 
response prevented rebel fighting in Ituri from destabilizing the peace process, allowing 
the UN to press forward with negotiations for a transitional government that year and, 
finally, free elections in 2006. 
 Another case, the 1993 U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, is a widely-
criticized example of a failed Western intervention in an internal African conflict.  In 
1992, the UN mission to monitor a ceasefire between rival warlords in Mogadishu and 
deliver food aid to the general population was meeting severe resistance in.  As the UN 
mission failed in late 1992, the U.S. led an emergency, UN-sanctioned task force 
                                                 
3 Daniel Bourmaud, “The Clinton Administration and Africa: A View from Paris, France,” Issue: A 
Journal of Opinion 26, no. 2: 49-50; Jonathan Stevenson, “Africa’s Growing Strategic Resonance,” 
Survival 45, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 167. 
4 Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Mace, “Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to 
Come?” International Peacekeeping 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 510-1. 
5 Fernanda Faria, “Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of the European Union,” The 
European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper no. 51 (April 2004): 43. 
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(UNITAF) in early- to mid-1993, to enforce security in southern Somalia and ensure free 
movement of the food aid.  After the deaths of eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu 
operations in October 1993, the U.S. quickly wrapped up its involvement in Somalia and 
coerced the UN into doing the same.  After three years of concerted effort to stabilize 
Somalia, the international community was forced to admit defeat in 1995.  The U.S.-led 
coalition failed to buttress UN operations in Somalia, resulting in a collapsed peace 
process.  To this day, Somalia continues to be wracked by political instability and its 
associated human suffering. 
C. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
The issue of Western intervention in Africa is part of the overarching debate over 
how peace support operations can be most effective in resolving conflicts around the 
world.  This debate is broken down into two parts: how should “success” be measured for 
peace support operations, and what types of missions and force contingents contribute 
best to “success.” 
1. Measuring Success 
How to define the success of peace support operations is widely debated, but most 
scholars agree that the effectiveness of the military contingent is important insofar as it 
contributes to the overall success of the conflict resolution process.  Robert Johansen 
takes a narrow view, focusing on whether or not the operations have a direct impact on 
halting fighting in their area of deployment.  In this view, a peace support operation 
would be successful if it reduced fighting between the disputants and prevented civilian 
casualties until political negotiations could get underway.6  Following this line of 
thought, Patrick Regan dubs an operation successful if it halts fighting for at least six 
months.7 
Taking a much more generalized view, Steven Ratner argues that peace support 
operations must positively impact a wide scope of issues surrounding the conflict, to 
                                                 
6 Daniel Druckman, et al., “Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions,” Mershon International Studies 
Review 41, no. 1 (May 1997): 157-8, 161. 
7 Patrick M. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press), 14. 
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include improving human rights standards, military codes of conduct, and the overall 
humanitarian situation.  The operations must create a net positive result for the disputants 
to the conflict, the people living in the conflicted area, the intervening forces, and all 
supporting organizations (such as the UN).8  Holding the middle ground, Diehl sets two 
conditions for a peace support operation to be considered successful: it must prevent a 
resumption of armed conflict between the disputants, and it must “facilitate a final, 
peaceful resolution to the dispute.”9 
Finally, other scholars weigh the political settlement process more heavily than 
the military aspect of the operation.  Bellamy and Williams offer indicators for success 
based on an inter-subjective understanding of conflict resolution:  all parties must view 
the operation as legitimate and agree on what constitutes fulfillment of its mandate.  Only 
then can a peace support operation contribute to conflict resolution.10  The end goal, 
conflict resolution, is also open to definitional debate.  Indications that a conflict is 
considered resolved could be an end to violence for any specified period, but this is 
problematic because no one can guarantee that it will not resume at a later date.  For this 
reason, Michael Doyle argues that the conflict resolution process must put in place a 
government of “self-sustaining self-determination:” a political settlement forged at the 
local level and enjoying consent and legitimacy on all sides.  This outcome focuses more 
on developing an indigenous political framework than on the actions of the interveners.  
Without such self-determination, halting the violence is at best a short-term solution 
because the root causes of the conflict have not been addressed in a manner satisfactory 
to all the disputants.11 
2. Strategies 
Further complicating the debate over the successfulness of peace support 
operations is the question of whether different types of operations should be judged by 
                                                 
8 Druckman, et al., 159. 
9 Paul F. Diehl, “Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace,” Political Science Quarterly 103, 
no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 489. 
10 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and 
Contemporary Peace Operations,” International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005) 161, 177-9. 
11 Michael W. Doyle, “War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations’ Post-Cold War Record,” 
in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen 
Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 543. 
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different indicators.  Peace support operations (PSO) is a general term used to encompass 
the full spectrum of possible interventions intended to resolve a conflict.  The spectrum 
ranges from peacekeeping missions on one end, to peace enforcement missions on the 
other; most missions far somewhere in the middle, with characteristics of both types but 
leaning more toward one end of the spectrum.  More than one type may also be used in 
any given conflict resolution process, but each is geared toward distinct goals. 
Peacekeeping is defined by the UN as “involving military personnel but without 
enforcement powers, undertaken … to help maintain or restore international peace and 
security in areas of conflict.”12  Most scholars characterize peacekeeping missions as 
distinct from peace enforcement missions in that they enjoy the consent of all parties to 
the conflict, act impartially with respect to all parties to the conflict, and use military 
force only in self-defense.13  In short, traditional peacekeeping missions do not interfere 
one way or the other in the conflict, but only monitor compliance or non-compliance with 
negotiated ceasefires or other conflict settlement mechanisms.14 
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has faced a surge in the number of crises 
taking place at the intrastate level, such as civil wars.  In such instances, peacekeeping 
was not sufficient to prevent the continuation of the conflict.  International organizations 
have widened the strategy behind their interventions to reflect a conflict resolution 
model, which calls for “peacebuilding.”15  “Expanded” or “strategic” peacekeeping now 
occupies the middle of the intervention spectrum, with multifunctional missions 
including: refugee resettlement, establishing democratic governance in the country, 
institutionalizing civil society participation in the new democracy, and socio-economic 
development.16  This is a more sophisticated model of conflict resolution; it attempts to  
                                                  
12 Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 3-4. 
13 Ibid., 4. 
14 Erwin A. Schmidl, “The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century,” in Peace 
Operations between War and Peace, ed. Erwin A. Schmidl (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 5-6; Doyle, 
530; Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall, “International Peacekeeping and Conflict 
Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 
(February 1998): 39-40. 
15 Diehl, Druckman, and Wall,  36. 
16 Findlay, 5; Schmidl, 5-6. 
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resolve the root causes of the conflict through a political settlement process geared 
toward statebuilding, while using peacekeepers in their traditional role to monitor 
compliance with this process. 
Peace enforcement missions, at the far end of the spectrum, pack more of a punch.  
They act to “induce one or more parties to adhere to a peace arrangement previously 
consented to by using means which include the use or threat of military force.”17  Peace 
enforcement missions can use their military power to coerce parties to the conflict to 
uphold the promises they made in conflict resolution negotiations, but not to help one 
side or another “win” the conflict through force of arms.  Enforcement missions can 
include providing security for humanitarian aid delivery, preventing massacres of 
civilians by recalcitrant war leaders, and otherwise applying combat forces to ensure 
compliance with the terms of a political settlement.18 
In contrast with peacekeeping missions, enforcement missions may operate 
without the express consent of the parties to the conflict; the rationale being that the 
parties consented to political settlement, and thus cannot object to being coerced into 
keeping the promises they made at the negotiating table.  Enforcement missions evolved 
primarily to counter the negative effects of “persistent spoilers,” or parties to the conflict 
who cannot or will not live up to their responsibilities in a political settlement; in such 
cases military force may be the only method capable of preventing them from wreaking 
the entire conflict resolution process.19 
Due to the different natures of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, 
different skill sets are required and different results are obtained in their use in the 
conflict resolution process.  As such, there is a distinct difference in what types of forces 
contribute to the success (as defined above) of peace support operations.  Below, I will 
lay out the key differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, 
followed by a synopsis of the debate over which types of forces are best suited to each. 
                                                 
17 Findlay, 6. 
18 Schmidl, 5-6. 
19 Bellamy and Williams, 183. 
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Peacekeeping missions are long-term, low-intensity operations that ideally 
continue until the conflict is completely resolved through political settlement.  
Negotiations must be far enough along so that a ceasefire is in effect, since peacekeepers 
are not equipped or mandated to engage in fighting.  In addition to the ceasefire, all 
disputants must consent to the deployment of the monitoring troops and the interveners 
must maintain their neutrality amongst the disputants.  In general, peacekeeping works 
best when the disputants are in a reconciliatory frame of mind; having reached a “hurting 
stalemate” in their fighting, they realize that their best bet is to accept third party 
mediation rather than to continue the conflict.20  This is one example of “ripe moments” 
for intervention,21 times when the disputants believe that they can come out ahead in the 
conflict through a negotiated political settlement in which all parties benefit – an 
integrative settlement.22  The intervener must constitute a legitimate and strong authority 
in the eyes of the disputants in order for it to prescribe a long-term, in-depth, 
statebuilding process that the disputants will continue to follow.  
Peace enforcement missions are in many ways the inverse of peacekeeping 
missions.  When a ceasefire is not working, enforcement missions are called in to halt the 
fighting, using violence if necessary.  Enforcers are actively coercing the disputants, and 
are thus engaged as a primary party rather than being a third-party mediator.  The 
disputants are non-compliant with conditions of the negotiation process, and may be 
hostile toward the entire process.  Factions may be incoherent, meaning that warring 
leaders either cannot or will not control their followers, who break the conditions of the 
political process.23  Spoiler groups, as discussed above, threaten the possibility of conflict 
resolution.  Significant factions believe that their best interests would be served by 
continuing fighting – they see the solution to the conflict being distributive (a zero-sum 
game) rather than integrative.24  In these conditions, traditional peacekeepers would be 
easily overpowered or killed, and the peace process would fall apart. 
                                                 
20 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution 
(Malden, MA: Polity, 2005), 166; Doyle, 547; Regan, 142. 
21 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 166. 
22 Diehl, Druckman, and Wall, 37. 
23 Doyle, 547. 
24 Diehl, Druckman, and Wall, 37. 
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Clearly, a stronger military presence is required to make peace enforcement 
operations effective.  A multilateral intervention may be ideal to monitor ceasefires and 
conduct other peacekeeping tasks, but it lacks several characteristics necessary to conduct 
stronger peace enforcement tasks.  When peace enforcement requires intervening to halt 
fighting, a unilateral or coalition approach is arguably more appropriate.25  Massive 
civilian casualties or other emergency situations call for a timely and robust initiation of 
peace enforcement operations.  Questions of relative political will and military capability 
bog down international organizations and prevent effective intervention.  If a single state 
or coalition of willing states decides that intervention in a particular crisis is needful, and 
the intervention is legitimized by an organization like the UN, then their resources will 
enable a more successful intervention.  Given high salience to a single state or coalition 
of states, the conflict resolution process will benefit from the financial, logistical, combat, 
and command-and-control capabilities of Western states, in particular.26 
Regional security organizations may theoretically have a high degree of collective 
salience toward intervening in a local conflict because it more directly affects their own 
states, but in reality these organizations often suffer from the same political dithering as 
larger multinational organizations like the UN.27  When regional or sub-regional 
organizations cannot agree on the salience of the operation, they lack the credibility and 
initiative necessary to enter into high-intensity peace enforcement operations.  Unilateral 
or coalition operations, if offered, are in a better position to threaten recalcitrant 
disputants with coercion or rapid escalation, to include the possibility of military 
enforcement.28  Even given high collective salience, regional organizations lack the 
money, military capabilities, and institutional capacity to conduct effective peace 
enforcement operations.29  
                                                 
25 Regan, 135. 
26 Findlay, 9; Regan, 150. 
27 Stephan F. Burgess, “African Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenges of 
Indigenization and Multilateralism,” African Studies Review 41, no. 2 (September 1998): 57. 
28 David Carment and Dane Rowlands, “Three’s Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in 
Intrastate Conflict,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 5 (October 1998): 591-2. 
29 Doyle, 553; Bellamy and Williams, 170. 
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Multinational organizations (regional or international) are often viewed as more 
impartial and legitimate authorities than those constituting unilateral or coalition 
operations, and thus may be better suited to picking up the long-term peacekeeping 
mission and political process after the peace enforcement mission is accomplished.30  A 
peace enforcement operation led by unilateral or coalition states must be careful to 
establish its legitimacy amongst the disputants and fellow conflict resolution actors – 
multinational organizations may fail to accomplish their follow-on peacebuilding 
missions if the transition from peace enforcement operations is uncoordinated. 
Throughout these debates, the issues over how to define success in peace support 
operations and what types of operations are most efficient become intricately entangled.  
For that very reason, some argue that it is the strategy of intervention itself that most 
influences the success of peace support operations.31  In other words, the issues revolve 
around figuring out what type of peace support missions should be used (along the 
operational spectrum), when they should be used, and who should conduct them.  Given 
that different missions might be used either simultaneously or in conjunction with other 
missions as part of one overarching conflict resolution process, should each mission be 
measured separately for its part in resolving the conflict?  If the strategy behind the peace 
support operations is flawed, and the related missions are mutually incompatible, they 
may in fact be working against each other and ruining the conflict resolution process.32 
The question of how to measure the success of peace enforcement operations, as 
distinct from the wider scope of all peace operations supporting conflict resolution, 
remains unresolved.  Ratner’s and Diehl’s measures of success for peace support 
operations are better suited to describing the overall success of the conflict resolution 
process than to specific peace enforcement missions.  Creating a lasting resolution and 
improved conditions for all parties, as they argue, are criteria too broad to accurately 
measure the impact of a peace enforcement operation.  Johansen’s criteria, in contrast, are 
too narrow: completing a mandate to reduce fighting between disputants and protect 
civilian lives is not sufficient to make a peace enforcement operation successful.  These 
                                                 
30 Diehl, 504-5. 
31 Regan, 141. 
32 Diehl, 50. 
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measurements leave a gap between what a peace enforcement operation carries out and 
how this relates to the success of the larger conflict resolution process.  In this paper, I 
will attempt to bridge this gap by measuring the success of peace enforcement operations 
as a function of whether or not they contribute to the progression of the peace process – 
the operations must do more than simply fulfill their mandates, but are also not wholly 
responsible for the endstate of the peace process.  
D. SPOILERS AND PEACE ENFORCMENT OPERATIONS 
A peace enforcement operation’s ability to tackle spoilers, those parties to the 
conflict who actively sabotage the conflict resolution process, could potentially fill this 
gap between peace support operations and the success of the conflict resolution process.  
As discussed above, the conflict resolution process is especially impeded by the negative 
influence of factions that are numerous, internally incoherent, and/or hostile to the peace 
process.  The case of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone provides an 
example of how a persistent spoiler group threatened to collapse the conflict resolution 
process. Bellamy and Williams’ analysis suggests that it was the leadership of the United 
Kingdom, through its peace enforcement mission in 2000, which put the conflict 
resolution process there back on track.  It did so by offering credible military opposition 
to the RUF, designated the primary spoiler group in the conflict resolution process.33  
Could this variable hold true across other case studies, explaining the success or failure of 
a peace enforcement operation within the conflict resolution process? 
In order to avoid conflating the issues contributing to the success of peace support 
operations and that of the entire conflict resolution process, this thesis will analyze peace 
enforcement missions, a mission type that proved pivotal to the two operations mentioned 
above: Restore Hope in Somalia, and Artemis in the DRC.  Peace enforcement operations 
such as these are particularly limited in scope – alone, they cannot provide conflict 
resolution.  A host of alternate peacebuilding functions (political settlement between 
warring factions’ demands, reconstruction, socio-economic development, etc.) must also 
occur before conflict resolution will succeed.  Arguably, peace enforcement operations’ 
most significant accomplishment lies in stabilizing the security situation so that the peace 
                                                 
33 Bellamy and Williams, 180-3. 
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process may remain on track.  Therefore, it may be unreasonable to measure the success 
of peace enforcement operations based on whether or not the entire peace process is 
ultimately successful.34  At a much more basic level, peace enforcement operations must 
at least be able to carry out their mandate; if the mandate is appropriately tied to the 
political process, this will support the larger goal of conflict resolution.  Given that 
unilateral or coalition forces seem to be more capable to conduct peace enforcement 
operations than international or regional multilateral forces, it remains unclear why even 
they do not always “succeed” in their mandate, let alone resolving the conflict.35 
In instances in which they were successful, such as the British role in breaking 
down rebel resistance in Sierra Leone, a key issue appears to be the intervener’s ability to 
tackle spoiler groups.36  To test this variable, I will look at coalition peace enforcement 
operations’ relative success in enabling the forward momentum of the political settlement 
process; the criteria being how well they deter spoilers from sabotaging the conflict 
resolution process.  My hypothesis is that the ability of a coalition to deter spoilers either 
enables or derails the progress of the political settlement process. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
I will examine case studies to test my hypothesis, using the method of difference. 
As the focus of this paper is on resolving African conflicts, my case studies will involve 
examples of peace enforcement operations in Africa.  The two cases I will study are the 
U.S.-led intervention in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope, 1993) and the European 
Union intervention in DRC (Operation Artemis, 2003).  These are two similar cases in 
that both involved Western-led coalitions attempting to provide limited physical security 
to a civil war-torn country in order to ameliorate horrific humanitarian conditions.  In 
both cases, the interventions were part of a wider UN-led mission in the target country, 
which were to similar degrees stateless societies.  In both cases, Western troops entered 
to prevent factions from killing civilians and to stabilize the security environment so that 
non-governmental organizations could distribute humanitarian aid.  The independent 
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variables in both cases were similar: direct action by Western coalitions to intervene in a 
civil war with a limited mandate supporting broader UN objectives.  The dependent 
variables in these cases, however, widely diverged: in DRC, the mandate was achieved 
and the broader goals for conflict resolution were supported (the DRC remains a case in 
progress, but evidence to date supports progress toward conflict resolution); in Somalia, 
the U.S. and UN missions collapsed under the weight of their own failures and no 
broader stabilization goal was achieved.  I will use within-case comparisons to examine 
the effects of the respective EU and U.S. interventions on the two conflict cases.  
As discussed above, the independent variable will be measured by how well the 
peace enforcement mission is able to deter spoiler parties.  Progress, the dependent 
variable, will be measured by the continuation of the operation’s wider, political 
settlement goals (i.e., statebuilding activities, transition to democratic government, and so 
forth) as relevant to each case. 
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II. SOMALIA  
 In my first case study, I will examine how peace enforcement operations failed to 
deter spoilers in Somalia, thus preventing progress from being made in the political 
settlement process.  Operation Restore Hope proved unable to tackle spoilers due to 
several factors.  First, problems associated with the mandate – differing conceptions of 
the mandate between the U.S. and the UN, and a shift in mandate as peace enforcement 
operations in Somalia transitioned to their final phase – prevented Operation Restore 
Hope from weakening the spoilers.  Second, the disconnect between peace enforcement 
operations and the political settlement process precluded synergy in the peace process.   
Finally, military operations had the unintended side effect of strengthening the 
primary spoilers to the peace process due strategists’ lack of understanding of Somali 
culture or power politics.  All of these factors, when combined, prevented Operation 
Restore Hope from deterring Somalia’s spoilers, allowing the spoilers to continue to 
derail the political settlement process and leave Somalia in a continuous cycle of conflict. 
A. BACKGROUND  
 Following the ouster of Somalia’s dictator, Siad Barre, in 1991, Somalia collapsed 
into a free-for-all struggle between various clans to control territory.  Any hint of central 
authority or state structure, which had been supported by Western aid, completely 
disintegrated into customary clan and lineage structures that provided security to their 
members.  Some clans retained grudges against others from years of divide-and-rule 
policies carried out during Siad’s regime, and were seeking to regain prosperity after 
years of oppression.  Weapons were widespread and access to food and other resources 
was zealously guarded by the clans controlling it.  The two main economic prizes were 
the interriverine agricultural region in southern Somalia and the capital, Mogadishu, to its 
east. 37   
 Control over these two areas represented predominance amongst the clans and 
thus security for its members.  The average Somali could only rely on his clan to channel 
resources to him; without clan alliances, he had no food, water, shelter, or security.  This 
                                                 
37 I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002), 263-5. 
16 
lesson had been reinforced by Siad’s rule, which had enriched his own clan at the 
expense of all the others.  With Siad gone, no one wanted to be left out in the cold again.  
Each individual Somali understood that his/her very survival was inextricably linked to 
that of the clan, forming an ‘attack against one is an attack against all’ mentality amongst 
the clans.38 
 The political frontlines in the struggle for southern Somalia lay between two rival 
clan leaders, Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi.  Aideed headed the Habar Gidir 
sub-clan of the Hawiye clan, which had opposed Siad’s Darod clan-based regime in 
southern Somalia.  Mahdi, also a Hawiye, was head of a rival sub-clan, the Abgal.  The 
Habar Gidir had recently won control over much of Mogadishu from the Abgal due to 
their strong military position in southern Somalia.  Mahdi, however, claimed political 
legitimacy for his forces by proclaiming himself the president of Somalia.  Added to the 
mix were multiple other clan leaders joined in destructive battles throughout Somalia.  
Because of the rampant destruction, looting, and massacres associated with their 
“armies,” such clan leaders became known as warlords.  The conflict between the 
warlords reached a new height in Mogadishu between 1991 and 1992.  The city was split 
between three forces – Darod, Abgal, and Habar Gidir – each led by a charismatic 
military commander (Morgan, Mahdi, and Aideed, respectively) and driven by the 
impetus to take over the whole city and its spoils of war.  Before the arrival of 
international forces, about 14,000 people had already been killed in the battle for 
Mogadishu.39 
3. Rival Factions and Humanitarian Disaster 
In parallel to the political fragmentation, socio-economic disasters were also 
destroying Somali lives in horrific numbers.  The fighting in the interriverine agricultural 
zone led to crops being destroyed and farmers killed, so that 300,000 Somalis died from 
the resulting famine.40  Humanitarian aid agencies rallied to the plight of starving 
Somalis, but their efforts were also impeded by heavy fighting and parochial clan 
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interests.  Food relief was just another source of revenue to the warlords, one that could 
back their military efforts against the other clans.  In a way, food aid exacerbated the 
collective security dilemma already existing between the clans.  Warlords charged 
international relief agencies 10-20% tariffs on their supplies before they would allow 
them to transit their territories to reach famine victims.41  Mogadishu became an even 
bigger prize, as the majority of distribution infrastructure being used by relief efforts was 
centralized in that city.  Controlling relief efforts made the difference between life and 
death for both the warlords and their subjects. 
4. International Intervention (1992-1995) 
This is the context under which the UN intervened in Somalia.  After more than a 
year, the UN had finally succeeded in brokering a ceasefire agreement between Mahdi 
and Aideed in March 1992.42  The humanitarian aid tap would be turned on for Somalia, 
but be monitored by UN observers to ensure its safe delivery to famine victims.  In April 
1992, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751 authorized the UN Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM).  Its mandate was to protect relief operations aimed at 
approximately 1.5 million starving Somalis.  The original deployment contained only 
fifty ceasefire monitors, but by November, the UN deployed about 3,500 armed troops in 
response to reports of inadequate protection for the convoys.43  U.S. and European 
transports airlifted food aid starting in August 1992, but its dissemination to needy 
Somalis continued to be blocked by Mahdi and Aideed.  By November, the ceasefire was 
in tatters as fighting in Mogadishu resumed, famine was out of control, and UNOSOM 
could not live up to the UN’s mandate.44 
Enter the CNN effect: Americans could not stomach the plight of the Somali 
people, and demanded more direct U.S. action.  The UN reported 300,000 dead and 1.5 
million at risk from famine.  With 700,000 refugees spilling over into neighboring 
countries, the Somali crisis constituted “a threat to international peace and security.”45  
                                                 
41 Lewis, 267. 
42 Lester H. Brune, The U.S. and Post-Cold War Interventions (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1998), 
13. 
43 Lewis, 267. 
44 Brune, 18-9. 
45 “Operation Restore Hope.”  UN Chronicle 30:1 (March 1993), 14. 
18 
President George Bush authorized 28,000 American troops under Operation Restore 
Hope to lead a multinational force in bolstering security conditions in southern Somalia 
so that food aid could be delivered.  On 3 December 1992, UNSCR 794 approved the 
United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) concept, authorizing member countries to offer an 
additional 9,000 troops.  UNITAF provided the threat of credible force so that aid 
shipments would no longer be impeded.46  Significantly, UNSCR 794 called for Chapter 
VII operations, recognizing that there was no legitimate state government in Somalia 
which could either request or deny UN operations there.47  The wishes of the warlords, 
theoretically- and legally-speaking, were immaterial to what the UN chose to do in 
Somalia.   
Practically-speaking, however, the cooperation of Mahdi and Aideed would be 
crucial to the success of the mission.  UNITAF brokered another ceasefire between the 
two warlords once it arrived, allowing UNITAF forces to spread out within southern 
Somalia.  The force gained control over the Mogadishu airport and seaport, as well as the 
key roads linking these ports with eight major cities in the South.  In doing so, it 
protected the delivery of food aid to the tune of 100,000 lives saved.  It stabilized the 
security situation in the South, then quickly withdrew, handing a simmering Mogadishu 
back over to the UN proper in May 1993.48 
The renewed UN peacekeeping and humanitarian aid mission, dubbed UNOSOM 
II, assumed that the relative security would last and shifted its focus to state-building.  
Aideed decided to no longer cooperate with intervention forces, however, and the UN 
was swiftly caught up in containing his aggressions.  In June, attempts to close down 
Aideed’s anti-UN propaganda machine and to inventory his weapons depot led to a battle 
in which 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed.  Aideed also seized the UN food 
distribution warehouse in Mogadishu.  The UN responded with UNSCR 837, which 
shifted the focus of UNOSOM II forces to disarming the warlords’ militias.  Assisted by 
U.S. special operations forces remaining in Mogadishu, UN forces tracked Aideed 
between June and October of 1993, believing that if they arrested him, attacks against UN 
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forces would halt.  Finally, on October 3, the infamous “Black Hawk Down” assault on 
Aideed’s location resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. service members and widespread 
media attention.  The political backlash caused the U.S. to withdraw its forces by March 
1994; the UN was forced to do the same by March 1995.49 
B. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (1992-1993) 
What did the international community aim to achieve by intervening in the 
Somalia crisis in 1992?  It soon became clear that not only did the populace need food 
aid, but it also needed someone to ensure that it bypassed the warlords and actually 
reached the people.  That was precisely why UNITAF was conceived, but why did it not 
work?  Surely 28,000 American troops could handle a little convoy duty?  In fact, they 
could, and they did.  While they had their share of problems, military operations did not 
doom the mission in Somalia.   
 The Somalia intervention was problematic because it was an attempt to solve a 
political problem militarily.  In hindsight, it has been recognized that humanitarian crises 
caused by war cannot be solved by humanitarian relief alone.  The political situation that 
engendered the humanitarian crisis must be dealt with simultaneously – thus tackling the 
root causes of conflict instead of just treating the symptoms.50  In the case of Somalia, the 
famine wasn’t spread primarily by natural disaster, but instead by the collapse of the state 
into civil war and the complete breakdown of political institutions.51  When, in UNITAF 
and UNOSOM II, the international community embarked upon peace enforcement 
operations, it was following a conflict abeyance model based on separating the factions – 
by force if necessary – to protect the lives of Somali civilians.  Peace enforcement 
operations, however, cannot make peace.  In order to actually end the humanitarian crisis, 
the international community needed to address the longer-term, underlying causes of the 
conflict alongside their short-term political-military operations.52   
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 In 1992, there was no long-term plan for Somalia and even the short-term plan 
demonstrated a decided lack of congruence between peace enforcement operations and 
the political peace process.  The differing interpretations of UNITAF’s mandate between 
the U.S. and the UN, as well as the mandate’s shift from convoy protection to enforcing 
peace-building operations under UNOSOM II, prevented military operations from 
deterring spoilers like Aideed.  In some cases, UNITAF actually strengthened spoilers 
due to planners’ misunderstanding of Somali power politics.  Even when successful on a 
tactical level, peace enforcement operations failed to support the political process.  As the 
lessons learned from intervention in Somalia demonstrate, failure to deter spoilers leads 
to a failure to complete a political settlement process and end conflict. 
1. Mandate Problems 
The one statement that best describes the political ignorance behind the Somalia 
intervention is President George Bush’s remark that U.S. operations there would be 
“purely humanitarian.”53  While the initial UN intervention had been conceived in those 
terms, from day one, operations on the ground had taken on political overtones.  
Monitoring a ceasefire and escorting aid deliveries evolved  into a more ambitious UN 
mandate for UNOSOM I: providing humanitarian aid, peacemaking, peacekeeping, 
statebuilding, settling political disputes, and  conducting an arms embargo.54  The lack of 
progress on the political front (which I will discuss further below) prompted the UN to 
beef up the military front with UNITAF in December 1992.  The U.S. would lead 
UNITAF in protecting food distribution, a narrow mandate not shared by the UN nor tied 
to the political process, and one that would shift over time. 
 Without any appreciation for the political failures underpinning UNOSOM I’s 
ineffectiveness, or how UNITAF would inherit them, President Bush sent in what he 
viewed as a strictly humanitarian operation.55  The U.S., after all, had no national security 
interest in Somalia at the time, so Bush did not consider interfering with Somalia’s 
internal political problems.  Instead, in the U.S. vision, UNITAF would ensure that the 
food aid reached the famine victims, then withdraw with all due speed, without 
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consideration for how its operations might have affected Somali political life.56  In 
contrast, the UN had  much loftier goals for UNITAF: Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali  claimed the force would “feed the starving, protect the defenseless and 
prepare the way for political, economic, and social reconstruction.”57  While the U.S. 
concentrated on tactical objectives designed to prevent warlord attacks on aid convoys, 
the UN was talking about a more strategic goal of destroying the warlords’ power base 
and stabilizing the security situation for the long term.  Boutros-Ghali started talking 
about UNITAF being responsible for disarming all  the warlords’ militias, but the U.S. 
believed that such political goals were best left to UNOSOM II and criticized the UN for 
trying to promote UNITAF “mission  creep.”58 Somalis, themselves, seem to have 
expected UNITAF to remove the warlords, which would enable them to restart their 
political process and establish a civilian government.59 
 The U.S. stuck to its tactical, military objectives throughout Operation Restore 
Hope.  The U.S. felt constrained to do so, because from the onset the operation had been 
planned to make use of U.S. military strengths rather than to further UN political goals.  
President Bush had chosen the strongest military response option, reasoning that 
overwhelming military force would cow the  warlords into submission.  As a result, U.S. 
military planners tagged the Marine  Corps as one of the key force providers for the 
operation – but the intensive  nature of Marine operations means that deployed units 
could only be used in a short-term capacity.  The planners also removed vital civil affairs 
and military police force packages from the operational order for Restore Hope because 
these units implied a longer-term commitment they wished to avoid.60  Bush wanted the 
U.S. to leave Somalia quickly, and by using the forces he did, he made that goal a 
practical necessity.   
 Once UNITAF forces were deployed in Somalia, they failed to appreciate  how 
their actions affected the warlords and thus counteracted the UN’s nascent  political 
process.  The head of UNITAF’s “diplomatic staff,” Robert Oakley, only  negotiated 
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with the warlords in order to exact guarantees from them that they  would not attack 
UNITAF forces spreading throughout Mogadishu.  UNITAF exercised no other political 
mandate.61  Thus, while UNITAF succeeded in restraining the warlords with the threat of 
overwhelming military force, it did not provide them with political incentives to give up 
fighting altogether.  The most powerful militia commander, Aideed, felt particularly 
endangered by UNITAF forces – but with UN political efforts completely divorced from 
UNITAF’s military mandate, he saw no way to translate his military strength into 
political concessions.62  Aideed felt he had no option but to ensure U.S. withdrawal 
before  he lost what power he had left. 
 As the U.S.’s scheduled withdrawal approached with the end of UNITAF’s 
mandate in May 1993, tensions between the U.S. and the UN heightened with regard to 
UNITAF’s mandate.  The UN expected UNITAF to have stabilized the security 
environment in southern Somalia to the extent that  UNOSOM II’s political goals would 
be achievable.  Accordingly, the UN  expected UNITAF to disarm the militias, undercut 
the warlords, stabilize security both inside and outside of Mogadishu, and establish an 
internal security apparatus.63  Simply put, the UN wanted UNITAF to fix the warlord 
problem so that UNOSOM II would not have to deal with it anymore.  The U.S. was not 
willing, or able, to do this.  Disagreements between the U.S. and the UN over whether 
UNITAF would use its military strength to stabilize the security situation  in Somalia 
prevented UNITAF forces from taking on the warlords and cutting off their ability to 
block the political peace process. 
 UNITAF interpreted the mandate to establish internal security forces as orders to 
create a police force at the local level – but attempting to do so from the bottom-up 
without a parallel effort to establish a political structure meant that this mandate was 
doomed to fail.64  UNITAF’s internal security apparatus ended up as militia “police” 
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forces empowered to help their warlords crack down on the populace.  By narrowly 
interpreting its mandate and neglecting to tie it to the political process, UNITAF failed to 
undercut the warlord spoilers.  When UNITAF withdrew, it blithely claimed that there 
was no longer a clan warfare  problem.  Unfortunately, the UN’s political process was not 
far enough along to  establish a civilian government in May 1993.65  With the 
withdrawal of UNITAF forces, Mogadishu became a military vacuum set to further 
destabilize the UN’s  political mandate.  The warlords were free to subvert the political 
process, as they had been doing before UNITAF’s arrival. 
 According to the UN Security Council, UNOSOM II’s mandate was to “provide 
humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political 
institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation,” 
by creating “conditions under which  Somali civil society may have a role ….”66  
UNOSOM II would be attempting peacemaking and statebuilding, a much larger task, but 
with less combat capability than UNITAF.  In addition to its fewer total troop numbers, 
UNOSOM II’s emphasis on engineering and other statebuilding forces meant that  they 
had drastically fewer peace enforcement troops at their disposal.  While UNITAF had 
held a credible threat for the warlords, UNOSOM II just did not have the same coercive 
power.67 
 Despite its Chapter VII mandate, UNOSOM II fell into the same quandary 
regarding the use of force that UNITAF had.  Peace enforcement operations, by  their 
very nature, do not require the consent of all parties to the conflict.  Nevertheless, 
UNOSOM II continued to court Aideed’s favor in hopes of  pacifying him; they had too 
limited a capability to coerce or constrain him, but  too heavy a presence for neutral 
peacekeeping.68  At the same time, the U.S.  restricted UNOSOM II’s rules of 
engagement to Chapter VI-style peacekeeping rather than the mandated Chapter VII 
peace enforcement, hoping to reduce  friendly casualties.  The warlords quickly learned 
that the UN lacked the teeth to compel compliance.69  If Aideed could simply keep the 
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UN, and most importantly the U.S. elements of UNOSOM II, off his back until the initial 
deployment expired in October 1993, he would prove the ineffectiveness of the 
intervention.   
 Aideed went one step farther, however, to ensure that all Western forces  would 
withdraw, using a series of carefully planned attacks and counterattacks against UN 
forces that culminated in the Mogadishu Massacre in October 1993.  Following 
increasingly fatal attacks against UN personnel attempting to inspect Aideed’s weapons 
stores and other facilities, the UN reiterated its intention to  disarm all parties in 
accordance with the political process and authorized the use of force to prevent the 
warlords from further attacks on UN personnel.70  Due to its military weaknesses, the 
UNOSOM II mandate seemed to have shifted from  the political process to force 
protection.  Initiatives to destroy Aideed’s ability to  hurt UN personnel backfired, 
American troops were ambushed while attempting to capture Aideed on October 3, and 
the U.S. announced its withdrawal from Somalia.   
 Without U.S. leadership in Somalia, the UN did not have the resources or 
international consensus to build a revised plan for neutralizing the stranglehold of  the 
warlords – the UN finally had to realize that the warlords were not genuinely interested in 
the political process underway to rebuild the Somali state.  When U.S. withdrawal 
became public knowledge, the security situation in Mogadishu further destabilized and 
the peace process collapsed.71  For both pragmatic and political reasons, UNOSOM II’s 
mandate shifted again: it renounced its strategy to capture Aideed, kept its forces out of 
harm’s way, and half-heartedly concentrated on political reconciliation until its departure 
in March 1995.72  Without the strength of the U.S.-led UNITAF forces, UNOSOM II did 
not even attempt to deter spoilers by weakening the warlords.  In the last year of its 
mission, UNOSOM II acknowledged the fait accompli: its mission was once again 
limited to monitoring ceasefire agreements between Aideed and Mahdi.  Now comprised 
of only Third World troop contingents,73 UNOSOM II was a specter of its former self 
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and an obvious indicator that the warlords had won the battle of wills – their commitment 
to continue fighting won out over the U.S.’s  unwillingness to absorb casualties.74 
2. Coordination with the Political Process 
As envisioned in December 1992, Operation Restore Hope was premised on the 
idea that providing food aid to starving Somalis would end their suffering.  For various 
political and military reasons, as mentioned above, the U.S. was not willing or able to 
commit to anything more.  The UN, however, already had loftier goals for solving the 
Somalia problem.  Even as the UN announced UNSCR 794, authorizing the UNITAF 
deployment, it portrayed the mission as just one step in a conflict resolution framework.  
According to the UN, UNITAF would “use all necessary means to establish as soon as 
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia … to restore 
peace, stability, and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of political 
settlement.”75  But how precisely would humanitarian relief operations contribute to a 
future political settlement?  It was already clear in December 1992 that famine was not 
the root of the Somalia catastrophe claiming so many lives.  The disconnect between 
UNITAF’s mandate and the political process prevented the peace enforcement operation 
from deterring the spoilers. 
 Indeed, the legacy of international intervention in Somalia has proven that the 
provision of humanitarian aid had absolutely no positive impact on the conflict resolution 
process.  In point of fact, humanitarian relief operations worked against conflict 
resolution by strengthening the warlords.  Without the warlords’ cooperation, UNITAF 
troops could not deploy throughout southern Somalia to provide security for the aid 
convoys.  At the same time, international cooperation with the warlords strengthened 
their political positions, both domestically and internationally, as evidenced by their 
increased stature as political representatives at the Addis Ababa talks.  Humanitarian 
relief operations proved contradictory to the political peace process being road-mapped 
by the UN during 1992-1993, precisely because the objectives of Operation Restore Hope  
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made the parties to the conflict less inclined to cooperate with a negotiated settlement to 
the conflict.  The short-term objectives for providing food aid trumped the long-term goal 
of a political peace process.76 
Peace enforcement operations cannot resolve conflicts, but rather enable conflict 
resolution by fostering an environment conducive to political negotiations.  The conflict 
in Somalia was political in nature, so a successful international intervention would have 
to deal with those political problems rather than provide the means by which the 
belligerents could continue to fight.  In short, peace enforcement operations must deal 
with spoilers to conflict resolution – in the Somali context, this would mean undercutting 
the warlords and empowering actors committed to conflict resolution.  Operation Restore 
Hope  negated the political peace process by instead empowering the warlords in its 
consuming drive to provide food aid.  Its mission was in no way geared toward setting 
the conditions for a negotiated settlement, and its military strength was not applied 
toward legitimizing the political peace process in the eyes of the Somalis.77 
While the most visible causes of the failure of international intervention in 
Somalia were military, the most substantive failures were political.  The political and 
military mandates had not been well linked, but above and beyond that problem was the 
complete lack of progress in political reconciliation between 1992 and 1995.  Initial 
efforts to start a political dialogue were established by the  UN Special Representative to 
Somalia, Mohammed Sahnoun, in October 1992.  He worked to bring representatives of 
clans and sub-clans together to create an agenda for future political reconciliation 
meetings.78  His initial successes were  interrupted by the new UNITAF leadership, 
which rewarded the military threat of the warlords by allowing them to attend as the 
twelve “political movement” representatives at the Addis Ababa talks in January 1993.  
While the UN General Assembly wanted the political process to culminate in a “final, 
comprehensive, politically negotiated settlement among all the political entities and 
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segments of the Somali people,” 79 it seemed safer to take the short-term solution of 
dealing with the warlords given the fact that UNITAF’s military muscle was preparing to 
depart in May.80  Unsurprisingly, no political progress was made and the warlords 
continued to fight. 
The second Addis Ababa meeting benefited from a rare alignment of UN political 
and military strategy.  In March of 1993, Mogadishu was experiencing a temporary 
reprieve from fighting due to the heavy UNITAF presence.  UN diplomats took 
advantage of this fact to jump-start the peace process.81  For once, cross-cutting civil 
society elements were included in the negotiations, although only during the 
humanitarian relief portions of the conference.  The “National  Reconciliation” 
portion of the conference was still dominated by what the UN viewed as the de facto 
leaders of Somalia: the warlords of the major clans.  Accordingly, the militia leaders 
approved a charter for a Transitional National Council (TNC) comprised of 57 councilors 
to be drawn from the militia factions and other social groups.  There were no mechanisms 
specified for ensuring that social groups at the regional levels would be duly 
incorporated,82 and the warlords were asked to voluntarily disarm their militias.83 
Time seemed to be working against the Addis Ababa conference, and for the 
warlords, on two levels: the imminent departure of UNITAF led the warlords to believe 
that they could wait out the UN intervention and in fact use it to their advantage, while 
the short timetable set by the UN for the peace process favored a political settlement too 
speedy to properly integrate the warlords’ possible opposition, civil society.84  In their 
haste to establish District Councils (precursors to the creation of the TNC), the UN 
sponsored candidates who lacked the support of traditional clan elders in their regions, 
thus alienating the most powerful actors in civil society from the reconciliation process.85  
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In addition, the warlords had no incentives to disarm, per the agreement, because those 
who did so risked facing enemies being resupplied by illegal arms shipments.  Over the 
course of the next two years, both Aideed and Mahdi continued to claim that they were 
obeying the Addis Ababa guidelines for disarmament but no substantive changes 
occurred in the political environment.  The UN and the U.S. became increasingly 
embroiled in punishing Aideed for his attacks on UN personnel, and the political agenda 
gradually fell by the wayside. 
Ironically, the political reconciliation process seemed to be more successful in the 
areas untouched by UN intervention.  In Puntland, in northeastern Somalia, clans allowed 
traditional clan elders to mediate their differences and help build a local administration 
peacefully.  In Somaliland, in the Northwest, traditional clan leaders were successful in 
overcoming sub-clan rivalries through the use of customary peace conferences (shir).  
The shir model has proven more effective than the UN-sponsored reconciliation model in 
the south, in large part because it does not channel Western money into the pockets of 
attendees. 86  The shir model has been proposed as an alternative forum for building a 
new Somali state: if it could be offered at the national level, at a neutral site guaranteed 
by third-party security, it could embrace a broad sector of civil society.  This would allow 
all the opposition forces with a stake in Somalia’s political future to come together as 
equals, instead of being dominated by the warlords’ military forces.87  As it was, 
however, follow-through on the Addis Ababa agreement stalled when the UN announced 
its intention to leave Somalia.  Once again, intervention forces felt forced to negotiate 
with the warlords in order to safeguard their transit through Mogadishu88 – this time, as 
they left for good.  The warlords maintained the upper hand, and the political process 
stalled. 
3. Strengthening the Somali Spoilers 
UNITAF also failed to deter the spoilers to the peace process by chronically 
misunderstanding the operational environment in Somalia, which had the unfortunate 
effect of strengthening the warlords instead of weakening them.  International diplomats 
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and military officers, even those who made the most sincere efforts to solve Somalia’s 
political crisis, were constantly hampered by their poor understanding of how Somali 
culture works.  Between Siad’s ouster and the beginning of the intervention, the U.S. had 
just one Foreign Service Officer monitoring events in Somalia from Nairobi.89  Needless 
to say, the decision-makers behind Operation Restore Hope did not have the most current 
or comprehensive information about the social, political, or military situation that  U.S. 
troops would face on the ground in Mogadishu.   
But even the seemingly “age-old” aspects of Somali culture seemed beyond the 
ken of Western planners.  Just as their ancestors had continually moved on in pursuit of 
better pastures, contemporary Somalis are continually reshaping their social structure to 
adapt to changing circumstances.  A key aspect of this dynamism surfaced during the 
international intervention: sub-clan rivalries for resources, like that between Aideed’s 
Habar Gidir and Mahdi’s Abgal branches of the Hawiye, were swept aside when they felt 
more threatened by foreign forces.90  The contours of the conflict shifted once UNITAF 
brought in overwhelming force – instead of dividing the militias and forcing them to the 
bargaining table for a real political settlement, UNITAF and UNOSOM II served  to 
unite their followers against the foreign troops. 
The concept of a neutral intervention also did not survive the journey from New 
York to Mogadishu.  In an environment characterized by inter-clan rivalries, negotiating 
with clan leaders automatically lends the taint of partiality.  After UN Special 
Representative Sahnoun developed a working relationship with Aideed, in  order to 
safeguard arriving UN forces and convene the first political meeting, Sahnoun was 
replaced by a new representative, Kittani.  Aideed refused to work  with Kittani because 
Kittani was not felt to be as cooperative as Sahnoun had been.  Aideed also believed that 
the UN backed Mahdi as the primary candidate for the future presidency of a restored 
Somalia, based in large part on the Organization of African Unity’s endorsement of 
Mahdi.  Aideed’s perception that UN favor was shifting from him to Mahdi led him to 
refuse to disarm his militia and later declare war on UN forces.91 
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 Diplomats also failed to understand that the very act of negotiating with the 
warlords lent those warlords legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali population.  When UN 
operations were predicated on ceasefires brokered between Aideed and Mahdi, the UN 
was in reality legitimizing the warlords as political leaders.  Making the warlords the 
stars of the peace conferences in Addis Ababa only further consolidated their hold on 
political power in Somalia.  The peace process ground to a halt whenever fresh fighting 
broke out between clan militias in southern Somalia, giving the impression that the 
warlords controlled the peace process itself.  UN-sponsored reconciliation meetings in 
Nairobi and other places supplied the warlords with bountiful patronage opportunities for 
their supporters, prestige, and foreign aid.92  UN funds, intended for the Somali people, 
instead worked to “line certain pockets, accord select individuals’ power, create new 
inequities, and breed all sorts of suspicions.”93  Aideed even managed to make money by 
leasing stolen property to the UN in Mogadishu – a situation which outraged the legal 
owners from other clans.94  Somalis could only come to one conclusion: one of these 
warlords would be supported by the UN as the next leader of all of Somalia, so they had 
better fight harder to ensure that it would be their warlord. 
Co-opting political legitimacy and economic aid were not the only arenas  in 
which the warlords proved themselves to be savvy, “astute entrepreneurs.”95  Once 
Aideed felt himself being cut out of the UN consultation loop in Mogadishu, he 
reinvented his image as the defender of the Islamic faith from foreign occupation.  
Aideed made good use of the low-tech tools he had at his disposal, broadcasting 
messages about UN colonialism over Radio Mogadishu.  His public relations campaign 
had significant success in damaging the UN’s image and bolstering his own as the only 
authentic leader of the Somali people.  The more the UN demonized him as an enemy of 
the people, the more support he garnered from the populace at large.  He translated the 
threat from the UN as against his entire sub-clan (and to a lesser extent, against all 
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Somalis) rather than against him personally.96  The U.S.’s technical superiority was of 
little use when confronting an enemy who understood his target audience.  If planners 
had grasped the clan mentality and the value of radio communication in Somali society 
earlier, they could have cut off Aideed from his potential supporters.97 
 Unwilling or unable to understand the options open to the warlords’ followers, the 
UN only made the situation worse by escalating its search and destroy tactics.  Repeated 
attempts to capture Aideed throughout September and October of 1993 resulted in 
horrendous collateral damage in Mogadishu.  In one case, a raid by U.S. special 
operations forces targeted a Habar Gidir clan meeting location, hoping to get Aideed.  
Instead, the U.S. soldiers  killed a number of clan elders alongside women and children.  
People who held tremendous power in their clan, the elders could have been recruited 
into the political peace process in time and used to neutralize Aideed’s support base.98  In 
this light, the retaliatory massacre of eighteen U.S. service members was only a symbol 
of the overall failure of the international intervention.  Peace enforcement operations in 
Mogadishu had united the public and the warlords against the international forces, and 
had given the warlords the support they needed to continue to spoil the political 
settlement process. 
C. PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AND THE SOMALI SPOILERS 
The dynamics of Operation Restore Hope sabotaged the peace process in Somalia 
by failing to deter the major spoilers to political settlement, the warlords.  Throughout the 
1992-1995 UN intervention in Somalia, peace enforcement operations ran askew of 
political negotiations, but the scale of force offered by UNITAF meant that its presence 
did the most damage to the peace process.  As a U.S.-led coalition, UNITAF enjoyed a 
credibility and capability to appropriately use force in support of its objectives in 
Somalia; unfortunately, its limited objectives (food aid) and timeline (a few months) 
meant that a less credible UN force would have to pick up where it ended in mid-1993.99  
The indirect support that Operation Restore Hope lent to the warlords would be 
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compounded by an ineffective transition between U.S.-led and UN-led peace 
enforcement operations in Somalia – the result being an inability to tackle the spoilers to 
the peace process. 
 Since the beginning of the UN operations in Somalia, the interveners had been 
held hostage to Aideed’s goodwill.  First, the UNOSOM I military observers were 
prevented from deploying throughout Mogadishu for two months by Aideed.  Then, 
Aideed hindered the follow-on UN security force of 500 men from deploying in the city 
because he feared that they supported his rival, Mahdi, against him.  Thus, the Pakistani 
contingent was held up at the Mogadishu airport indefinitely.  Aideed’s de facto control 
over key sections of the city caused the UN troops’ mandate to shift toward force 
protection/self-defense and away from the various UNSCRs they were there to 
implement.100  In order to jump-start their mission, UN forces had to cooperate with 
Aideed throughout 1992.  Even at this point, it was clear to UN policymakers that Aideed 
was not acting as a good-faith participant in any kind of peace process for Somalia.  
Aideed’s actions represented just the first of many stalling tactics that characterized his 
role as a spoiler. 
 Enter Operation Restore Hope, a U.S.-led contingent equipped to bypass 
impediments like Aideed and conduct peace enforcement operations rather than 
observation duties.  Under its Chapter VII mandate, UNITAF had the right to forcibly 
disarm factions that got in its way during humanitarian relief operations.  Accordingly, 
UNITAF forbade the use of technicals (truck-mounted machine guns), roadblocks, 
banditry, and the open display of weaponry within its operating areas.  These rules 
provided an effective deterrent against further violence in these areas because the 
warlords understood that UNITAF forces were primarily concerned about the safety of 
the aid convoys.  The warlords kept their weaponry outside of visible range, and 
UNITAF forces left them alone.  While UNITAF commanders had the option to forcibly 
disarm belligerent factions, they felt that it was not necessary to complete their limited 
objectives. This understanding – both spoken and unspoken – between UNITAF forces 
and the warlords contributed to largely successful humanitarian relief operations, but also 
failed to address the threat to political settlement posed by the warlords.  As Operation 
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Restore Hope drew to a close, the interveners prepared to transition into UNOSOM II.  
The U.S.-led coalition came under increasing pressure from the UN to actively disarm the 
warlords’ militias, but UNITAF did not see disarmament as part of its mandate in 
Somalia.  After all, UNITAF was there to provide security for food aid, not to stabilize 
the security environment in support of a political peace process.  In short, Operation 
Restore Hope ignored the issue of spoilers, and handed over a simmering security 
environment to UNOSOM II in March 1993.101  
 At that precise point in time, de facto collusion between the warlords and 
UNITAF forces vaulted the warlords into key positions in the Addis Ababa negotiations: 
in return for being legitimized as political representatives, the warlords would allow 
UNITAF to finish its humanitarian relief operations and return home safely.  As UNITAF 
left and UNOSOM II military personnel took over in Mogadishu, Aideed no longer 
feared military retaliation for his many provocations against the UN-led, voluntary 
disarmament process attached to the Addis Ababa accords.  Lacking incentives to give up 
his military might and thus weaken his bargaining position vis-à-vis the other warlords, 
Aideed resisted disarmament.  UNITAF, which had been equipped (if unwilling) to 
handle such a scenario, was gone.  UNOSOM II, suffering from command and control 
problems and a general lack of credibility, was overwhelmed to the point that it made the 
arrest of Aideed a priority in the disarmament process.  Thus, the military expedient of 
dealing with Aideed’s remaining militia became a political objective in and of itself.102  
Because UNITAF had not worked to create a security environment permissive to the 
political goals of the peace process, UNOSOM II was unable to effectively counter 
spoilers like Aideed.  Finally, the UN was forced to leave Somalia altogether due to a 
“lack of sufficient cooperation from the Somali parties over security issues” which had 
“fundamentally undermined the UN objectives” for conflict resolution in Somalia.103 
 Attempts to establish a political process fell apart before a transitional 
government could get off the ground; state rebuilding was a failed dream of the UN.  
Military force threatened the livelihoods of the warlords and scared the populace, while 
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the political reconciliation process neglected to offer either the warlords or strong 
elements of civil society incentives to create a stable government.  The make-or-break 
point in the intervention occurred during Operation Restore Hope, when UNITAF forces 
had the power necessary to tackle the warlord spoilers and stabilize the security situation 
so that the political peace process could move forward.  Without a mandate to do so, or 
strong ties to the ongoing political negotiations, Operation Restore Hope remains the 
prime exemplar of how peace enforcement operations can achieve their narrow objectives 
















III. THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) 
In the last chapter, I showed how Operation Restore Hope had not been able to 
deter spoilers in Somalia, leading to the failure of the political settlement process and a 
continuation of the conflict.  Without an effective peace enforcement operation there, 
conflict resolution efforts stalled indefinitely.  The DRC, however, provides an example 
of how effective peace enforcement sparks progress in the political settlement process.  In 
this chapter, I will demonstrate how Operation Artemis used its highly credible threat of 
force impartially, enforcing the peace and rescuing the political settlement process in the 
DRC. 
A. BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT 
1. Civil War 
By 1997, the country that would become the Democratic Republic of Congo had 
been ruled by the wily dictator Mobutu Sese Seko for over thirty years.  During that time, 
Mobutu had capitalized on the divisiveness of the Congolese ethnic groups comprising 
the country, playing them against each other to prevent any one group from posing a 
serious threat to his regime.  As part of this strategy, he had stoked resentment between 
“indigenous communities” in the Eastern Congo and the “immigrant” Rwandan people 
who had been living alongside them for decades.  Following the Rwandan genocide in 
1994, this ethnic tension was exacerbated by the mass influx of Hutu refugees, 
threatening the tenuous ethnic balance in the Eastern Congo.104   
Congolese Rwandaphones had lived in the Eastern Congo Ituri and Kivu 
provinces since the colonial period, during which foreign mining interests had 
perpetuated divide-and-rule tactics between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups.  The 
socio-economic change created by international exploitation led to forced migrations and 
disrupted land ownership and grazing rights between ethnic groups.  As in Rwanda, the 
predominantly pastoralist people (in this case the Hema) became the privileged elite, 
while the Lendu were relegated to being farm laborers.  Mobutu’s policies during the 
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post-independence period, which favored the Hema in land reform issues, continued to 
spark animosity between the groups and sometimes led to localized communal violence.  
Mobutu had been careful not to let the conflict get out of hand, however, as this would 
jeopardize his hold over the country as a whole.  This situation ensued until the balance 
was overturned by the regional turmoil resulting from the 1994 Tutsi-Hutu bloodshed in 
Rwanda, which spilled over into the Eastern DRC.105 
The civil war that erupted out of the East in 1996 demonstrated the interface 
between national, regional, and local violence in the DRC – the ethnic tensions at the 
local and regional levels in the East served as catalysts for a national and international 
war, which in turn fostered cyclic violence back at the local level.106  Because of these 
linkages, the stability of the DRC as a whole, and the Ituri region in particular, was 
dependent on dealing with those responsible for perpetuating violence at all levels. 
2. Regional Intervention 
In 1996, Laurent Kabila spun together a coalition of elements dissatisfied with 
Mobutu’s harsh rule and quickly took over the country from East to West, proclaiming 
victory in Kinshasa.  His coalition was made up of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for 
the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL), which was comprised of predominantly Tutsi 
fighters supported by both Uganda and Rwanda to overthrow Mobutu.  The Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) government in Rwanda supported Kabila’s coup in return for the 
ability to destroy massive Hutu refugee camps in the Eastern DRC, which were 
responsible for anti-regime attacks into Rwanda and threatened to destabilize Rwanda’s 
new Tutsi government.  Congolese Tutsis in the AFDL joined Kabila’s forces in their 
campaign for Kinshasa, while the RPF made use of local supporters to destroy the 
refugee camps in 1996.107  Uganda, a strong ally of the RPF government, also backed the 
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AFDL and Kabila.  When Kabila took Kinshasa in May 1997, the bulk of his fighting 
forces were Rwandans and Congolese Tutsis from the East.  
The alliance of convenience soon soured, however, as Rwanda and Uganda 
exploited their newfound access to the mineral resources of the Eastern DRC.  Rwandan 
and Ugandan troops in the East co-opted local collaborators and established warlords to 
facilitate their exploitation of metal and gas deposits there.  The AFDL created a $250 
million contract with a Canadian mining company in 1997, giving it rights to cobalt and 
copper mines and making the coalition partners rich.108  Kabila started to regret the free 
reign he had given to his erstwhile partners and his dependence on their fighters.  Rwanda 
claimed that Kabila was not cooperating fully with its campaign to root out Hutu 
insurgents in the border region, and in turn used this as a pretext to occupy the Eastern 
DRC and secure its economic interests in the 1996-98 time period.  Kabila, fearing that 
his Tutsi army officers would assassinate him on Rwanda’s orders, attempted to purge all 
Congolese and Rwandan Tutsis from his military forces in 1998.109  He ordered the 
massacre of all Tutsi military recruits; shortly thereafter, the Second Congo War 
commenced.  Between 1998 and 1999, Rwanda and elements of the former Congolese 
Armed Forces (FAC) from Mobutu’s era waged war on Kabila’s regime and sparked 
renewed civil war across the DRC.110 
The ethnic dimension to the war continued to reflect the struggle for control over 
local, regional, national, and international politics.  Warlords throughout the East claimed 
to represent ethnic constituencies, but instead made alliances with various Congolese, 
Rwandan, and Ugandan factions based on their ability to provide economic or political 
riches.  The “authentic” or traditional tribal leaders attempted to keep their people out of 
the fighting in order to avoid further cycles of retribution and unchecked violence from 
their neighbors.111  The warlords, in contrast, had nothing to lose and everything to gain 
in the escalating fighting in the East – without militias to back them up, these men would 
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lose their newfound positions of prestige and wealth.  These local struggles were 
exacerbated by the intervention of Kabila’s, Rwanda’s, and Uganda’s forces in the East.  
Kabila’s fate as the DRC’s leader was jeopardized by the instability in the East, and the 
East was destabilized by intervention from Kinshasa and neighboring country forces. 
As the Second Congo War heated up in August 1998, Uganda and Rwanda were 
drifting apart in the East.  While in a position to halt the fighting and end the war, they 
instead manipulated the local security environment to their advantage.  Both Rwanda and 
Uganda had economic incentives motivating them to manage, but not stop, the fighting.  
The Second Congo War was characterized by battles over turf and resources rather than 
political ideology.112  The Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) occupied the Ituri 
province in August 1998, initially in support of Rwanda’s invasion of the DRC, 
ostensibly to ensure security.  However, by 1999 the various proxies being propped up by 
Rwanda and Uganda split apart and their leaders worked to mobilize their own ethnic 
support bases.  In effect, the proxies further polarized the Hema and Lendu groups 
throughout Ituri and made them dependent on the warlords for survival.113   
The Ugandan-backed RCD-ML (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – 
Movement de Libération) faction established its headquarters in the provincial capital of 
Ituri, Bunia, and incited Hema attacks against Lendus there.  Lendu fighters retaliated 
with massacres in Bunia.  By 2001, full-scale ethnic cleansing campaigns rolled across 
Ituri as factions took over new territories and/or lost ground as alliances shifted.  Uganda 
backed a succession of proxies as it pillaged Ituri’s natural resources, relying on Hema 
acquiescence in return for greater land ownership at the expense of the Lendu.114  By 
August 2002, a new Ugandan-backed warlord, Thomas Lubanga, controlled Bunia.  As 
Lubanga’s Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) began to purge Lendus in Bunia, the 
movement lost the support of the Hema traditional authorities, as purges sparked 
retaliation against Hemas in rural areas of Ituri controlled by other factions.  Again, pre-
civil war leaders recognized the warlords and their proxy militias as impediments to the 
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peace process underway for Ituri and the DRC, but were powerless against the militias.  
Further splintering of factions led to Lubanga’s UPC switching allegiance to Rwanda, 
and a new Ugandan proxy coalition retaking Bunia in March 2003.  At that time, Lendu 
fighters cleansed the Hema residents and destroyed non-governmental organization 
(NGO) offices because of their perceived bias toward the Hema. 115  The cycle of 
massacres and exploitation of the local communities seemed irreversible so long as 
Ugandan and Rwandan support remained a driving factor for warlordism. 
3. The Political Settlement Process Stalls 
Since the end of the Second Congo War in 1999, the peace process for the DRC 
has been drawn-out and fraught with setbacks.  The war officially came to an end with 
the Lusaka ceasefire of 1999, which required all the countries that had intervened in the 
civil war in the DRC to withdraw their troops and stop supporting proxy rebel militias.  
Lusaka provided the mandate for the UN to form MONUC, which would be responsible 
for the disarmament and demobilization of all rebel militants.  Uganda and Rwanda, 
however, delayed implementing Lusaka due to their concerns over instability in Ituri and 
the Kivus, which threatened their own national security.  Finally, in 2002, the two 
countries agreed to cease supporting insurgencies in the East.  That year, Uganda pledged 
in the Luanda Agreement to withdraw its forces and support for the UPC and other 
militias in Ituri.116   
One of Uganda’s conditions for withdrawing its forces from Ituri was that  a 
mechanism would be constructed to deal with the lack of security along Uganda’s border 
with the DRC.  Recognizing that the interference of neighboring states was crippling the 
overall peace process in the DRC (and specifically Uganda’s actions in Ituri), the Luanda 
Agreement created a bilateral security mechanism in which the Kinshasa and Kampala 
governments would pacify the East.  Most of the major factions active in Ituri agreed to 
create a secure environment in which Ituri could be administratively reunified and foreign 
soldiers would be forced to return to Uganda.  Thus, the Luanda Agreement also provided 
for the establishment of the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) – representatives from 
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various ethnic groups and civil society throughout Ituri would come together to 
administer the province until the federal government became operational and could 
effectively govern Ituri.  In effect, the UN left the task of creating security in Ituri to the 
warlords and deposed administrators who had not been able to stand up to them 
throughout the Second Congo War.  Only those militias with strong bargaining positions 
– meaning current control over territories and resources – were included in the Luanda 
Agreement negotiations in 2002.117   
Meanwhile, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue attempted to settle the political  future 
of the DRC amongst the various rebel leaders and Kabila.  In December 2002, the major 
warlords from across the DRC and Kabila agreed to a two-year transitional government.  
In Sun City, in April of 2003, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue concluded with the 
establishment of a political structure for the transitional government.  Kabila would be 
president and the leaders of the four main rebel factions would be vice presidents until 
national elections were to take place in 2005.118 
In April 2003, the IPC conjoined in Bunia and formed the Ituri Interim 
Administration (IIA), the political leadership of the province who would implement the 
beginning stages of reconstruction.  Significantly, the IIA relied upon the UN to ensure 
the safety of civilians and administrators until reliable DRC police and military forces 
could be formed.119  Bunia was experiencing a brief lull in the fighting due to the 
presence of 7,000 Ugandan troops.  The UPC had been driven out of Bunia by the 
Ugandan forces in early March, and a ceasefire was in effect.  The IPC took advantage of 
the relative calm to form the IIA, and Uganda agreed to a timetable for withdrawing from 
Ituri and handing the security situation over to the IIA and its UN supporters.  But, 
 Ugandan redeployment in early May led to renewed violence as the UN proved 
unable to fill the security vacuum. 
Thomas Lubanga and the UPC became the primary spoiler to the IPC, since he 
had not been part of the previous peace negotiations that created it and his militia stood to 
lose control over Bunia and Ituri if the peace process went forward.  The violence in Ituri                                                  
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had been too chaotic and the allegiances too complicated for the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue to include all of its rebel leaders in the negotiations for the peace process.120  
Because of the constant shifting and splitting of militia factions in the East, agreements 
reached during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue negotiations inevitably excluded latecomer 
players like Lubanga, and those warlords seated at the table refused to renegotiate for a 
smaller share of the pie with newcomers.  Kabila’s government, Uganda, and their 
respective proxies in Ituri came to an understanding in December 2002, allowing each to 
retain influence and control within Ituri to the exclusion of Lubanga.  The UPC’s 
demands went unrecognized into the spring of 2003.121 
In March 2003, Uganda’s proxy routed the UPC from Bunia and brokered a 
ceasefire between the remaining militias, allowing the IPC to meet in early April.  Under 
UN guidance, the IIA established itself to reconstruct and rehabilitate the province with 
the help of community members, militia leaders, and government spokesmen.  The IPC 
mandated one department of the IIA to oversee the stabilization of the security 
environment, but relied on UN promises to deploy a multinational force in Ituri capable 
of enforcing the March ceasefire as the UPDF redeployed to Uganda.122  
4. The United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) 
MONUC had been established in 1999 to monitor the implementation of the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.  Continued fighting between the remnants of various 
national armies, militias, and rebel forces meant that civilians needed protection while the 
security environment was dealt with in the ongoing peace process.  Recognizing that 
simply observing atrocities being committed against the local populace was not enough, 
the UN empowered MONUC with a Chapter VII mandate in 2000, which stipulated that 
UN forces “protect the civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”123  The UN 
was not able to garner the political will from the member states to back up this mandate, 
and MONUC suffered from a decided lack of troop contributions.  By 2001, MONUC 
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had fielded just 200 of the 5,537 troops originally called for in the 2000 mandate – the 
UN was forced to downgrade the mandate to ceasefire monitoring.124 
Throughout 2001, the spiraling humanitarian catastrophe in the East embroiled 
MONUC in fierce debate over the protection of civilian life.  In June 2002, the UN 
responded by reinstating the protection mandate in UNSCR 1417, which called for 
MONUC to be reinforced in order to conduct peace enforcement operations.  The UN 
allocated 8,700 troops to peace operations in the DRC, which would include the 
deployment of the 712 Uruguayans to Bunia and others for security sector work in Ituri.  
This, too, turned out to be too little too late: a MONUC special investigation team 
traveled to Ituri in February 2003 to look into reports of the Lendu-Hema ethnic 
cleansing campaigns, and identified that the current MONUC forces could not afford 
adequate protection to the populace.125   
When Ugandan soldiers redeployed home from Bunia in late April 2003, as 
dictated by the IPC process, Lubanga’s forces returned and 400 civilians were 
slaughtered as his militia retook most of the city.  Bunia split into two armed camps, with 
Lendu militias controlling the South and Hema militias controlling the North.  UN troops 
supposedly mandated to guard the city and protect civilian lives fell back to UN facilities, 
as they were too undermanned and outgunned to do otherwise.126  MONUC, with only 
712 Uruguayan military guards in Bunia when the 7,000 Ugandans left, was in no 
position to enforce the March ceasefire or prevent the re-emergence of spoiler groups like 
the UPC.  Likewise, the federal police force deployed from Kinshasa proved 
incompetent, turning its weapons over to the militias and deserting due to lack of pay.  In 
early May, ethnic cleansing accelerated and MONUC forces proved insufficient to defend 
NGO offices, let alone guarantee the safety of the civilians in Bunia.  Throughout early 
May, various militias hunted down opposition community leaders and aid workers while 
MONUC hid in its compound.  A new round of negotiations took place to include the 
UPC, which had de facto control over half of Bunia.  The militias agreed to share the city 
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and accept deployment of a new international peacekeeping force, but before MONUC 
could be reinforced, the UPC reneged and conquered the entire city.127   
As MONUC, international aid workers, local officials, and civilians came under 
attack in Ituri, the UN recognized that the imminent failure of the IIA would drag the 
national peace process down with it.  In late May, belatedly, the Secretary General called 
for “the establishment of the framework of security in support of the Ituri Pacification 
Commission process, which remained the ‘real chance of comprehensive peace and 
reconciliation in the area.’”128  At this time, MONUC could muster only 4,700 troops in 
the entire country.129  Ituri required its own peace enforcement brigade under MONUC 
rather than a few hundred guards who were, in effect, operating under a Chapter VI 
mandate.  The Uruguayan troops deployed to Bunia under MONUC were only mandated 
to guard UN and IPC facilities and personnel, not to protect civilian lives.  MONUC’s 
presence, however, had the unintended consequence of raising hopes amongst the civilian 
populace that they would be protected by MONUC.130  While the IIA administrators may 
have been protected in their compound, guarded by the Uruguayans, they clearly could 
not fulfill their rebuilding and reconciliation mission from within their walls, especially 
while the target population was being slaughtered by spoilers like Lubanga.   
As far as Lubanga was concerned, his inclusion in the peace negotiations was too 
little too late.  Without a credible force to deter him, he was able to use force to control 
Ituri’s resources and continue to destabilize the wider peace process in the DRC.  While 
the removal of direct external support for violence in Ituri had been accomplished, ethnic 
conflict remained a viable strategy for the warlords to perpetuate their aspirations for 
political and economic power.131  The entire peace process for the DRC was in jeopardy 
due to MONUC’s inability to ensure security in the East, and vice versa. 
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B. EU INTERVENTION 
In the spring of 2003, the international community recognized that the massacres 
occurring in Ituri had to be contained if the peace process in the DRC were to go forward.  
While the UN had not been effective in soliciting member state troop contributions for 
MONUC, countries were willing to offer up forces for a coalition peace operation over 
which they could exercise greater control.  For this very reason, talks between key 
member states, the UN, and the European Union (EU) coalesced into Operation Artemis 
in May 2003.  Over the course of the summer, Artemis proved itself able to deter spoilers 
by bringing the military capacity that MONUC lacked to Bunia.  Artemis’s logistical 
superiority, special operations forces, and air support made it a credible peace 
enforcement mission in the eyes of the spoilers to the peace process. 
1. French Instigation for Intervention 
Since Belgium had granted Zaire and other central African countries 
independence in the early 1960s, France had considered itself guardian of their interests.  
Having supported the dictator Mobutu throughout the Cold War, France was eager to 
rectify the situation that had developed after Mobutu’s overthrow and regain its influence 
in the DRC.  In order to deflect accusations of neocolonialism, France was looking to 
intervene in the DRC with the blessing of a UN mandate.  France also recognized that the 
militia leaders in Ituri and their Ugandan and Rwandan supporters would not view a 
unilateral intervention as impartial,132 given France’s history of king-making in the area. 
Thus, France began planning for intervention in early May 2003, while 
negotiations with the EU and UN proceeded.  As the EU’s Political and Security 
Committee worked up a proposal to deploy a European force to augment the UN in Ituri, 
France prepared to lead it as the “framework nation” behind the operation.133  Due to its 
experience of interventions on the continent, and its continued presence in the form of 
pre-positioned troops and equipment there, France offered a very practical rationale for 
leading the notional EU force.  But the introduction of a European force into the area 
threatened to provoke accusations of partiality due to the perception of neocolonialism, 
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particularly on the part of France in Central Africa.  The multinational composition of 
Artemis helped to disabuse those perceptions, however, as the mission contained troops 
from eight different countries, some without any national agenda in Africa.134 France had 
the forces and the political will to intervene in the DRC, and by working through an EU 
coalition of the willing (to be mandated by the UN), it would gain the international 
legitimacy it needed to successfully launch the operation in Ituri. 
2. EU Intervention and the UN Mandate 
In late May 2003, the UN Secretary General recognized that the deteriorating 
security situation in Ituri demanded a brigade-sized force dedicated to Bunia.  
Desperately needing First World resources to buttress MONUC, but unable to obtain and 
field them in time to avert genocide in Ituri, the UN settled for an EU-led deployment.  
On 30 May, UNSCR 1484 authorized the Interim Emergency Multinational Force 
(IEMF) for the DRC, nicknamed Operation Artemis.  It was mandated with Chapter VII 
powers to 
contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the 
improvement of the  humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the 
protection of the airport, the IDPs in the camps in Bunia and, if the 
situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, 
UN personnel and the humanitarian presence.135   
The IEMF’s responsibilities included protecting the 20,000 IDPs in Bunia, the 
airport that MONUC and the NGOs relied upon, as well as international peacekeepers 
themselves.  All the signatories to the Luanda Agreement and all participants in the IPC 
would have to cooperate fully with Artemis forces.136 
The situation that had developed in Bunia and greater Ituri demanded an effective 
peace enforcement presence to support the IIA’s mission and the greater political process 
in Kinshasa.  Unable to expedite an effective force, the UN settled for the IEMF for the 
summer of 2003.  When IEMF forces would withdraw in September, MONUC forces 
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would have to be augmented into a brigade-sized force – the UN realized that armed 
factions hostile to the peace process would test MONUC in Ituri once Artemis left.137 
3. Enforcing Peace 
Operation Artemis was authorized for only three months’ duration, expiring on 1 
September 2003.  It was a short-term surge of forces designed to stabilize the security 
environment and then transfer a stabilized Bunia back over to MONUC so that the UN-
sponsored peace process for the DRC could continue.  On 12 June, Artemis forces 
deployed from Europe to Bunia, through a forward operating base at Entebbe, Uganda.  
French military aircraft in Chad, Gabon, and Uganda provided reserve tanking, close air 
support, and reconnaissance capabilities to the operation.  Strategic airlift, however, was 
beyond even the EU’s organic capabilities and had to be brokered from third party 
countries – the EU, unlike the UN, could call upon outside airlift assets quickly.138 
Starting out, Artemis benefited from logistical superiority, with a full complement 
of European combat engineers to maintain airfields at both Bunia and Entebbe, Uganda.  
Bilateral ties between European states and Uganda brokered the use of Entebbe as a 
forward operating base for the duration of Operation Artemis.  Entebbe was vital to the 
deployment and sustainment of Artemis troops in Ituri: all personnel, supplies, and 
equipment from the EU were funneled through Entebbe.  Alone, Bunia airport could not 
handle the size of aircraft needed to bring the sheer volume of cargo necessary for 
combat troops in Ituri.  Strategic airlift resourced by the EU, both organic and contracted, 
carried Artemis resources to Entebbe, where it was transshipped via tactical airlift to 
Bunia.  The fact that the EU could provide such airlift, and maintain a busy operating 
tempo in Entebbe, enabled it to project force into Bunia in a way that the resource-
strapped UN could not.139 
As the advance forces for Artemis began deploying into Bunia from 6-12 June, 
local militias tested their commitment and strength.  Lubanga redeployed 15,000 of the 
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UPC’s militants to the outskirts of the city in preparation for Artemis’s arrival, but left 
700 soldiers in the city to protect his position.  Clashes between factions gradually 
diminished as more EU peacekeepers arrived and started patrolling Bunia in earnest.  
Initial impressions that the French troops were battling the Lendu militants alone – 
effectively taking sides – were disproved when Artemis forces defended civilians in 
Bunia from both Lendu and Hema militants.  Once the main force was on the ground in 
Bunia, the operation’s commander, Gen. Thonier, retracted his earlier statement that 
“separating the factions is not part of my mission,” and demanded the disarmament or 
dispersal of all militants from Bunia.140 
On 22 June, Thonier announced the creation of a no-weapons zone within 10 
kilometers of Bunia.  Lubanga tested Artemis’s resolve, leaving his troops camped within 
Bunia’s suburbs and inside this zone.  Artemis, unlike MONUC forces in Ituri, had the 
combat-ready forces necessary to enforce the separation of the militias and civilians.  In 
early July, Artemis forces raided one of Lubanga’s non-compliant camps just outside 
Bunia, at Miala.  While the EU force searched the camp for outlawed arms, a group of 
rebels threatened the Artemis troops with a rocket-propelled grenade, forcing the EU 
troops to open fire and kill three militants.  Over the course of its deployment, Artemis 
continued to seek out and confiscate weapons on several occasions, provoking firefights 
that killed 20 militants.141  While smaller factions had been suspicious of Artemis, 
fearing that it would be partial to the UPC forces in Bunia due to their entrenched 
position there,142 Artemis demonstrated its intent to root out all militants from Bunia 
when it overturned camps like Miala. 
 When Artemis cleared all rebel stockpiles from the Bunia zone, it displayed 
impartiality as well as credibility – both Hema and Lendu militants would be fired upon 
if they provoked Artemis forces by carrying weapons into Bunia or threatening 
civilians.143  While different factions remained present in different areas of the city and 
suburbs, they could not launch an offensive against each other or Artemis.  EU forces 
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introduced common rules-of-engagement between the militias and Artemis – militants 
could not enter the city armed.  If Artemis learned of rebel arms, it sent out a task force to 
remove them from the militants’ control.  Artemis acted as “impartial and proactive” 
enforcers of the peace in Bunia.144 
A large part of Artemis’s credibility stems from its use of Special Forces in 
situations like Miala.  In order to search out and confiscate rebel weaponry, the peace 
enforcement mission had to be capable of engaging in combat with militants unwilling to 
lose their caches.  When attacked by guerilla forces, Artemis had to be able to respond 
with overwhelming force, but without endangering nearby civilians.  The battle at Miala, 
within the no-weapons zone around Bunia, stands as an example of the effectiveness of 
Special Forces in this regard.  Of its 1,100 troops in Bunia, Artemis boasted around 320 
Special Forces soldiers that could be sent out on such missions while the regular forces 
guarded Bunia and the local populace.  The UN recognized that the use of Special Forces 
“gave the IEMF a highly effective capability to engage and neutralize armed threats even 
beyond the area of operations.”145   
Artemis’s credibility as enforcer of the peace was also enhanced by its use of 
close air support.  Again, historical ties between France and neighboring African states 
afforded Artemis the use of military airbases within range of Bunia.  French fighter 
aircraft pre-positioned in Chad and Uganda buzzed over Artemis forces in the initial 
stages of deployment to signal Artemis’s firepower to actors who may have been 
contemplating provoking EU forces.  French support aircraft in Chad, Gabon, and 
Uganda provided refueling and aerial reconnaissance capabilities to Artemis throughout 
its deployment.  French combat support aircraft lent an intimidation factor to the Artemis 
deployment that UN troop transports could not provide for MONUC forces.  While the 
1,100 EU troops could have been overwhelmed by a concerted attack of the more 
numerous militants, the projection of airpower on behalf of Artemis ground forces 
exponentially increased Artemis’s credibility as a deterrent to hostile militias.146   
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 Altogether, the EU’s access and willingness to employ its logistics, Special 
Forces, intelligence, and close air support capabilities proved to be fundamental to 
Artemis’s success.147  None of these capabilities was offered to MONUC by the UN 
member states, because the states preferred to retain them under what they considered 
more reliable command and control – namely, a more cohesive organization like the EU.  
Each contributed to Artemis’s credibility to deter hostile militants by reinforcing its 
combat strength.  They enabled the EU to project “the threat or the use of force in a 
convincing manner” and to rapidly “establish its presence and stabilize the area of its 
deployment.”148  Installing a credible peace enforcement operation in Ituri allowed the 
immediate humanitarian crisis149 to be dealt with rather than further exploited by rebel 
leaders like Lubanga. 
4. Paving the Way for Political Settlement 
By September, Bunia was largely pacified and civilian lives had been protected 
inside the disarmed zone.  However, as EU forces prepared to hand their mandate over to 
MONUC, it became apparent that the relative calm in Bunia had been won at the expense 
of greater Ituri.  Militants and weapons had been forced out of Bunia, but the rebel groups 
had not been demobilized or reintegrated into regular society.  Instead, they continued to 
operate with impunity in the countryside, in which Artemis did not have jurisdiction or 
the operational capacity to police.  Lubanga’s militia regrouped and went on to battle for 
control over nearby territories and resources.150   
The UN authorized a MONUC brigade specifically to deal with the Ituri region as 
a whole, recognizing that insecurity in the East threatened to destabilize the peace process 
just as much as insecurity in the West did, despite the East’s isolation from Kinshasa.  
But, where Artemis has succeeded in providing security for Bunia, MONUC forces 
lacked the capacity to enforce peace similarly throughout Ituri.  When Artemis 
redeployed, the equipment and logistical capacity that it had brought with it went home, 
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as well.  The peremptory changeover from Artemis forces to MONUC left MONUC 
without the military superiority and its associated credibility to deter rebel forces from 
attempting to spoil the IPC.151  While Operation Artemis had been key to tackling 
spoilers in Ituri, further follow-through on the part of the UN would be vital to the overall 
success of the peace process in the DRC. 
In order to build on Artemis’s success in Bunia, the UN Security Council 
authorized an increase in MONUC forces to 10,800, with a brigade-sized force to 
continue security operations in Ituri.152  But one year after Artemis’s withdrawal from 
Ituri, MONUC troop levels on the ground had reached only half of the authorized number 
at approximately 5,900.  The UN Security Council recognized that it needed to step up 
efforts in the East to “promote the re-establishment of confidence, to discourage violence, 
in particular by deterring the use of force to threaten the political process.”153   
This language spoke to the heart of the security problem in Ituri: unless spoilers to 
the peace process could be tackled effectively, the peace process would never become 
more than mission statements.  The precedent set by Operation Artemis, which had used 
its credible threat of force and impartial implementation of security measures to deter 
spoilers in Bunia, encouraged MONUC to fortify its forces in Ituri and ensure the 
momentum of the political settlement process in the DRC. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED: OPERATION ARTEMIS AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
In order to prevent rebel factions from spoiling the local and national peace 
processes, Artemis had to operate a highly effective peace enforcement mission in Bunia.  
MONUC had displayed its inability to provide enforcement when enforcement was 
clearly needed, as the actors in Bunia disregarded international efforts that could not 
stand up to rebel forces.   
 To be effective, a peace enforcement mission must first be viewed as a credible 
deterrent to the combatants.  The 700 federal police officers and the Uruguayan battalion 
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had not been a credible deterrent, as evidenced by the police’s desertion and MONUC’s 
withdrawal to its own compounds, both of which left the civilian populace at the 
militants’ mercies.  Artemis, in contrast, had the full resources of the EU at its disposal, 
which offered several advantages that UN forces lacked.   
 By clearing a zone around Bunia, their area of operations, Artemis’s Special 
Forces prevented rebel factions from using the suburbs as a launching point for attacks 
against Bunia, the international presence there, and the local populace.  The UN, on the 
other hand, cannot muster Special Forces (to command and control) under its blue flag.  
Countries that contribute to UN operations like MONUC simply are not willing to give 
up such valuable, and limited, resources to foreign control.  They fear that their Special 
Forces would be (at best) squandered on UN operations, and (at worst) misused by inept 
multinational commanders and thus put in unnecessary jeopardy.  With its long history of 
Chapter VI peacekeeping missions, the UN is not structured to make proper use of 
Special Forces.  Due to their history of military interoperability under NATO and the 
growing political ties within the EU, European military and political leaders were much 
more willing to use Special Forces for peace enforcement when commanded by a EU-
hatted general.   The Special Forces (contingent of Artemis) proved to be a key resource 
for the pacification of Bunia, and one that MONUC could simply not provide in Ituri. 
 Artemis was also more effective than MONUC in deterring spoilers in the DRC 
due to its logistical superiority and air support.  The resources of the EU enabled the 
quick deployment and reliable sustainment of Artemis forces.  The EU’s finances 
allowed it to contract strategic airlift, bringing Artemis troops into Bunia within days and 
weeks, rather than the months projected by the UN.  Strong bilateral relationship between 
France and a number of African countries proved invaluable to securing forward basing 
for tactical airlift and close air support.  Simply knowing that EU forces could be so 
easily reinforced by ground forces and fighter jets acted as a deterrent to rebels seeking to 
reignite the conflict.  With its credible threat and use of force, when and where necessary, 
Artemis effectively deterred Lubanga and other rebel factions from derailing the political 
settlement process. 
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 But the credibility to use force as a deterrent is not sufficient to prevent spoilers 
from sabotaging a peace process.  Actors who stand to lose out due to a lack of incentives 
in the negotiations will be even more zealous about retaining their territories, especially 
when they fear that their competitors might gain at their expense.  Thus, the impartiality 
of a peace enforcement mission is as crucial to its success as its credibility.  From the 
onset, Artemis refused to support one side against the other.  Artemis was very careful to 
maintain impartiality during the course of its deployment, since any apparent preference 
for one group or another would pit the others against the peace process.  While MONUC 
had deployed as an impartial presence in Ituri, its lack of credible force had made it 
vulnerable to armed factions and reliant on faction leaders for survival.  Artemis’s 
impartiality, coupled with its credible use of force, enabled it to succeed where MONUC 
had failed in deterring spoilers like Lubanga. 
The credibility and impartiality of Artemis directly contributed to its success in 
enforcing peace in Bunia.  Artemis’s capability and willingness to engage militants 
within the zone saved thousands of lives in Bunia.  While the protection of civilian lives 
might be considered an end in and of itself, doing only that would not equate success for 
Artemis’s mission, nor contribute to the long-term success of the peace process.  The 
effectiveness of Artemis forces ensured that the “political process in Ituri was allowed to 
resume some activity as political offices reopened in Bunia and the town population 
began to return … economic and social activities were resumed.”154  MONUC could 
return with an Ituri brigade to enable implementation of the national peace process in 
Ituri, and the IIA could begin to create political order and reconstruction in the province.  
Artemis both supported the national peace process by preventing a resumption of wide-
scale warfare in the East, and at the same time integrated Ituri into the peace process by 
supporting the establishment of the IIA while the transitional government got off the 
ground.155  In Ituri, Artemis deterred the spoilers to the peace process, enabling it to go 
forward in the DRC.  
Artemis contributed to the wider conflict resolution process in the DRC by 
allowing the IIA to get off the ground, facilitating fledgling political incorporation of Ituri 
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into the DRC peace process.  Since the Inter-Congolese Dialogue had come to agreement 
on establishing a national transitional government, MONUC focused on facilitating the 
pacification of Ituri, which was a prerequisite for its inclusion in the national dialogue.  
According to the UN, “supporting the IPC and the establishment of an Interim Authority 
in Ituri became the central pillars of MONUC’s political strategy for Ituri.”156  Without 
the deployment of Artemis in the summer of 2003, the IIA would have been annihilated 
and Ituri would have remained excluded from the wider peace process.  
 The very fact that Ituri was seen to be dealt with by Artemis also allowed the 
transitional government to come into being in June 2003.  Warlords like Lubanga had 
significant disincentives to allow the peace process to go forward and to relinquish power 
in Ituri, since they would not benefit from peace.  While dozens of ministerial positions 
were being awarded to various factions as part of the transitional government, Lubanga 
had only what he could hang onto by force of arms in Ituri.  Lubanga, and other spoilers, 
jeopardized attempts to operate a parallel peace process in Ituri in the form of the IPC.  
By undercutting the spoilers’ efforts in Ituri, Artemis gave the transitional government 
the breathing room it needed to convene, while at the same time preventing Uganda from 
re-engaging in Ituri due to the worsening security environment on its border. 
Artemis also enabled the later deployment of MONUC’s Ituri brigade, which would 
tackle the more long-term issues of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of rebel 
fighters into civilian society, as well as the economic and social reconstruction necessary to 
ensure a sustainable peace.  Artemis provided a crucial stopgap against the absolute lack of 
law and order in Ituri, which had the potential to spread westward toward the incipient peace 
process in Kinshasa, just as the First and Second Congo Wars had done.  By providing 
security for humanitarian relief operations in Bunia, Artemis cooled down the conflict in Ituri 
and created an environment in which the local, and thus national, peace process could 
proceed.  If Artemis had not established a foothold in Ituri and normalized the security 
situation in Bunia, the follow-on MONUC Ituri brigade would not have been able to continue 
with the longer-term post-conflict reconstruction and peace building.  Artemis’s ability to 
deter spoilers in Bunia ensured the success of the entire political settlement process in the 
DRC. 
                                                 


























A. DETERRING SPOILERS 
In the last two chapters, I examined case studies that demonstrated how peace 
enforcement operations can either succeed (DRC) or fail (Somalia) in deterring spoilers 
to a peace process, which in turn constitutes either backsliding or progress in the political 
settlement of the conflict.  In this chapter, I will analyze these peace enforcement 
operations under Stephan Stedman’s framework for dealing with spoilers, showing how 
the strategies used in each case determined the success or failure of the operation in 
ensuring progress in a political settlement to the conflict. 
1. Spoiler Theory 
The backbone of spoiler theory lies in how participants in a peace process can 
prevent rogue actors from “spoiling” the chances for peace through their continued 
fighting.  According to Stephan Stedman, an international force that has assigned itself 
the responsibility of resolving a conflict must realize “coherent, effective strategies for 
protecting peace and managing spoilers.”157  How they do so depends greatly on the 
characteristics of the spoilers they are confronted with, as well what capabilities the 
interveners can bring to the negotiating process to engage the spoilers accordingly. 
While the “spoilers” can be painted broadly as any actor “seeking to undermine 
peace processes or prevent implementation of peace accords,”158 individual spoilers must 
be drawn in fine detail to discover what their motivations are before an appropriate 
management strategy can be developed.  In other words, before one can deter a spoiler, 
one must first understand what drives him to oppose the peace process.  In the following 
pages, I will examine the types of spoilers encountered in Somalia and the DRC, and then 
identify the strategies the respective peace enforcement operations used to deal with 
them. 
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2. The Somali and Congolese Spoilers 
In Stedman’s framework, knowing the four factors that characterize a particular 
spoiler situation assists interveners in determining the strategy best suited to deterring 
them.  The first factor is the position of the actor in regard to the peace process – is the 
individual or group currently included or excluded from negotiations for a political 
settlement?  Secondly, how many spoilers are there in the conflict resolution process?  
Next, what type of goals does the spoiler have in regards to the peace process – does he 
insist on a small bundle of specific rewards or allocations (“limited”), do his goals change 
based on changes in his strength vis-à-vis other actors (“greedy”), or does he have 
grandiose goals that he will stop at nothing to achieve (“total”)?  Finally, wherein does 
the locus of the spoiler problem lie – is it the leader of a rebel group who spurs his 
followers on to renew conflict, or is it a case of disenfranchised rebels ignoring orders to 
lay down arms? 159  Not all of these characteristics are equally relevant in any given 
spoiler situation, but at least one of them will provide the key to effectively identifying 
the nature of the spoiler problem, which in turn will enable interveners to determine an 
appropriate strategy for deterring the spoiler(s). 
In both Somalia and the DRC, the spoilers can be best typified as “greedy.”  
These are actors who seek to maximize their benefits throughout the conflict and even 
conflict resolution process, whose ambitions inflate or deflate depending on their strength 
relative to the other actors.  They may start out with a limited number of demands, but 
these demands will grow as their perceived ability to win them through fighting 
increases.  Even when expecting relatively limited demands from peace negotiations, 
greedy spoilers demonstrate a high commitment to achieve those demands – they can, 
and will, return to open conflict because they are willing to risk their forces to achieve 
their goals.  The size of their goals depends only on their capacity to achieve them at any 
given moment in time; they constantly conduct a cost/risk calculus to determine whether 
to comply with a political settlement or to renew fighting.160  Greedy spoilers use the 
threat of force to demand inclusion in political negotiations if they have been previously 
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excluded; if already included in the peace process, they will attempt to undermine 
implementation of any settlement in order to renegotiate better terms for themselves.161 
In Somalia, the political environment during Operation Restore Hope did not 
favor a comprehensive peace process.  No provisional settlement existed in Somalia, and 
the United Nations was attempting to force Aideed and the other warlords to the 
negotiating table by bringing in a massive peace enforcement mission that threatened 
their grip on power.162  The Addis Ababa accords were on the horizon, but nothing had 
been settled.  In this situation, Aideed knew that he would be included in any political 
negotiations due to his superior forces in Mogadishu.  What he did not know was whether 
his piece of the pie would be proportionate to his de facto superiority in 1992.  Thus, he 
attempted to manipulate the outcome of political negotiations by retaining – and even 
expanding – his sphere of influence in Mogadishu as negotiations proceeded.  Aideed’s 
stalling tactics epitomized the greedy spoiler as he instigated horrific bloodshed in the 
city in an effort to prevent peace enforcement operations from reducing his power base. 
In addition to seeking to expand his power base in the classic “greedy spoiler” 
sense, Aideed can arguably also be deemed a “legitimate spoiler.”  In Somalia, the strong 
central state under Siad Barre had been responsible for the brutal repression of people 
outside of his own ethnic group.  He had used the state as a tyrannical weapon, and 
Aideed, among many others, had lost out on opportunities for political representation and 
economic development under Siad Barre’s administration.  Memories of that regime, 
along with the general decentralized nature of Somali society, gave people reason to 
resist the imposition of a new central state under UN auspices.  Somalis wanted a return 
to peace, but not necessarily state building along the Western model.  In this respect, 
Aideed appeared to be a “legitimate” spoiler in the eyes of the populace.  As I 
demonstrated in Chapter II, clan interests prevail over any notion of “national identity” in 
Somalia; support for a future centralized state could only be gained from the warlords and 
their followers if they perceived a benefit to their clan from it.163  In order to deter 
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Aideed from spoiling a political settlement to the conflict, the interveners would have to 
consider a strategy that acknowledged his legitimate concerns about the peace process 
and include these considerations in the negotiations. 
In the DRC, the presence of a spoiler in the form of Thomas Lubanga, when 
coupled with the structure of the political negotiations underway in 2002-2003, created a 
situation in which Lubanga could afford to be greedy.  Political negotiations had reached 
a provisional settlement, meaning that the primary actors had been pressured by the 
international community into signing an agreement, but the practical results of the 
agreement were in flux.  The final allocation of state power and resources had not been 
decided, as the country was in a transitional period based on future benchmarks in the 
political settlement process.164  Joseph Kabila and the seven leaders of the major factions 
in the civil war were awarded positions in the transitional government ranging from 
president to vice-president and deputy, and their followers became ministers of 
parliament or government administrators.  During the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and 
subsequent peace agreements, the relative strength of the factions – based on the size of 
their forces and territories – when they sat down to the negotiating table determined the 
level of position they attained in the transitional government.   
The transitional government would serve as a temporary power-sharing 
agreement until national elections could be held in a few years.  The timetable for the 
transitional government to be replaced by countrywide elections created a situation in 
which the included factions had incentives to use stalling tactics to delay progress toward 
elections, while the excluded factions had incentives to overturn the political settlement 
altogether in hopes of being included in a new one.  Amongst both the included and 
excluded factions were “warmongers, who either had everything to lose with the peace or 
had too much to gain from war to accept a settlement of the conflict.” 165  
Lubanga fit into this shell perfectly – as I discussed in Chapter III, he had nothing 
to gain from peace, as he had not been included in the negotiations due to his late 
entrance into the ranks of powerful rebel leaders.  He also had much to gain from 
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continued fighting, as it garnered him control over lucrative natural resources, labor, and 
increased social status in Ituri.  If he allowed the Ituri Interim Administration to establish 
its control over the province, he would lose all of the gains he had won militarily over the 
last few years.  With the Ugandan soldiers gone, he could continue to exploit the security 
vacuum in Ituri only as long as the transitional government did not succeed in 
establishing a presence in the East.  Lubanga, being a rational actor, realized his tenuous 
position and decided to commit the forces at his command to laying siege to Bunia.  
While he may have simply been attempting to hang onto his power base in Ituri, he may 
also have seen that the growing insecurity in the East would jeopardize the forward 
momentum of the political settlement in Kinshasa.  If his continued fighting contributed 
to dissolving the peace process, he would be opening a path to greater political and 
economic power for his own faction at the national level.  At the very least, Lubanga was 
determined to hang onto his role as a major player in Ituri, and would commit all his 
resources to that end.  Lubanga’s commitment to extending his power base throughout 
Ituri whenever and wherever he could, absent stiff resistance, made him a greedy spoiler 
who would have to be dealt with by the sponsors of the DRC peace process. 
3. Strategies for Deterring Spoilers 
In each of these case studies, an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of the 
spoiler problem and the dynamics of the conflict reveal where pressure needs to be 
applied in order to effectively deter the spoilers.  Greedy spoilers like Aideed and 
Lubanga, who will take what they can get out of the negotiating process, can often be 
dealt with by meeting their core demands and simultaneously reducing the opportunities 
for them to create impediments to conflict resolution throughout the negotiating 
process.166  This strategy combines positive inducement, the offer of rewards in the 
political settlement, with coercion, the threat and use of punitive action against anyone 
who does not comply with the political settlement or breaks agreements made during the 
negotiating process.  The effective balance between positive inducement and coercion 
depends greatly on the circumstances of the conflict resolution process, and may not be 
readily apparent due to the shifting dynamics of the negotiating process.  Stedman calls 
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this strategy socialization, as it is used to shape spoilers’ attitudes toward the peace 
process and induce compliance with a political settlement that is underway.167 
An important factor in a strategy of socialization is recognizing the balance of 
power that prevails on the ground at the time political negotiations occur.  Because 
greedy spoilers will demand as many concessions from the political negotiations as they 
can get away with based on their military dominance, the opportunity structure of the 
negotiations must be shaped to offer them a better deal in peace than in war. Throughout 
the entire negotiating process, both real and potential spoilers are constantly analyzing 
their decision calculus, weighing the risks versus gains from continuing the conflict.168  
Positive inducement, or concessions, may be included in the process to reward compliant 
behavior on the part of the parties to the conflict.  This may include agreement to 
recognize the grievances that had provoked one or another party to turn to armed 
struggle, such as guarantees of social equality for a party’s ethnic group in a new state 
constitution, or an ethnic quota system for a new parliament.  Depending on the root 
causes of any particular conflict, many meaningful rewards may be devised to appeal to 
the parties to the conflict and give them a reason to prevent continued violence. 
Rewards alone, however, may not keep the actors on track in the peace process.  
Once rewards have been promised, actors could become greedy spoilers and either 
demand further concessions or default on their promises altogether in the hope that they 
will win greater rewards from prolonging the conflict.  This is where coercion comes into 
play in the strategy for deterring greedy spoilers.  According to Stedman, coercion “relies 
on the use or threat of punishment to deter or alter unacceptable spoiler behavior or 
reduce the capability of the spoiler to disrupt the peace process.”169  If positive 
inducement were the carrot, coercion would be the stick.  Coercion both provides a 
negative inducement (the threat of punishment) to guarantee compliance to political 
agreements, as well as active enforcement of a political settlement if a spoiler chooses to 
ignore the threat and reneges on his promises.  Coercion prevents one actor’s 
intransigence from reigniting the conflict and spoiling the entire peace process. 
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Coercion, as a tool, must maintain the opportunity structure, based on the balance 
of power on the ground, in place when the actors began political negotiations.170  When 
factions finally agree to sit down at the negotiating table and consider resolving their 
conflict politically, it is because they have reached a “hurting stalemate” in the conflict: 
they believe that they have more to gain from a political settlement than from prolonged 
violence because they are not winning the armed conflict.171  When a “hurting stalemate” 
has been achieved, the factions are “ripe” for a negotiated settlement, but if the 
negotiations unravel or the implementation of a peace agreement fails, the factions are 
said to “unripen.”172  In other words, greedy spoilers are quick to sense the vulnerabilities 
of peace agreements and their subsequent implementation.  Decisions that they had made 
a few months (or years) ago may seem counterproductive to them later on as their relative 
situations change.  If the pressures that brought actors to the negotiating table are 
withdrawn, they may attempt coercion of their own against the interveners in order to 
reshape the contours of the negotiations to their benefit. 
Coercion is used to persuade potential spoilers that they will not succeed in such 
an endeavor.  When spoilers attempt to limit the implementation of a peace agreement, a 
viable peace enforcement operation becomes necessary to maintain the “hurting 
stalemate” and prevent any spoiler faction from becoming too powerful.  Once an 
agreement has been reached, but has not been fully implemented, the factions face a kind 
of collective security dilemma in which a strong faction that defects stands to profit at the 
expense of the other factions.  Only a strong, credible peace enforcement intervention 
will be able to confront such greedy spoilers and prevent the dismantling of the peace 
agreement.  At the very least, an effective intervention must be able to tackle the military 
capabilities that the spoiler uses to renew fighting.173 
Credibility was a vital factor in the strategies used by Operations Restore Hope 
and Artemis.  Operation Restore Hope could have provided a highly credible intervention 
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force, but in contrast to Artemis, Restore Hope’s disconnect with ongoing negotiations 
for a political settlement prevented it from deterring spoilers.  UNITAF’s insistence on 
operating under a mandate for humanitarian relief operations, rather than providing peace 
enforcement in line with the Addis Ababa political negotiations, only served to 
strengthen the spoilers rather than deter them.  From the outset, UNITAF negotiated 
directly with Aideed to enable its peaceful entrance into Mogadishu, subverting the 
multiparty talks sponsored by the UN.  Because of the U.S.’s desire to avoid 
confrontation, UNITAF required at least the passive consent of Aideed to operations 
within his sub-clan’s considerable territory.  UNITAF’s arrival in Mogadishu buoyed 
Aideed’s status at the Addis Ababa I negotiations in January 1993, at the same time that 
the UN seemed to support Mahdi as the legitimate leader of Somalia. 
According to spoiler theory, the optimal course of action for intervening in 
Somalia would have been to maintain the balance of power that prevailed when 
negotiations had started in earnest.  In fact, this issue proved paramount for Aideed; the 
UN’s reluctance to recognize his military superiority over Mahdi and provide him with 
proportionate positive inducement during the negotiating process prompted Aideed to 
push for the international intervention’s withdrawal from Somalia altogether.  The UN 
had not succeeded in negotiating a political settlement before the arrival of peace 
enforcement operations, so the warlords continued to vie for power in order to improve 
their bargaining positions in any future agreement.  While Mahdi appeared to be 
negotiating in good faith, this could have been more a result of his military inferiority 
than his desire for peaceful resolution to the conflict.  UNITAF’s overwhelming force 
threatened to negate Aideed’s military superiority vis-à-vis Mahdi, robbing Aideed of 
outright victory in the conflict in Mogadishu.  UNITAF’s arrival forced Aideed to the 
negotiating table, but its unwillingness to maintain the balance of power between the 
warlords’ forces made impartiality in the peace process illusory.174   
UNITAF’s presence altered the balance of power in Mogadishu at a time when 
the two warlords were not prepared to agree to a comprehensive political settlement.  
Aideed was clearly stronger than Mahdi, so by stopping the fighting, the UN-sponsored 
                                                 
174 Clapham, 51-2. 
63 
peace process appeared partial to Mahdi.  Aideed, in reaction, impeded UNITAF’s 
freedom of movement and limited its effectiveness unless it deferred to him for 
negotiated access.  It is possible that the balance of power between the two warlords 
could have been maintained, and thus the political process moved forward, by UNITAF 
using its strength to enforce disarmament of all the factions.  If UNITAF had embraced a 
disarmament mandate, as pressured to do so by the UN, its credible threat of force could 
have reinforced the political process instead of working against it.  However, UNITAF 
did not do so, and Aideed succeeded with his stalling tactics throughout the negotiating 
process.175 
As UNITAF was preparing to leave, the UN called for disarmament of the 
factions as negotiated in Addis Ababa II.  UNOSOM II, much weaker militarily than 
UNITAF had been, would have to attempt to enforce disarmament of Aideed’s militia.  
Mahdi appeared to comply more readily, possibly because he was more invested in the 
negotiations and could readily obtain replacement weapons on the black market if 
negotiations soured.  Aideed, in contrast, seemed to prefer not to lose his military 
superiority and viewed disarmament as a direct attack against his power base.  Following 
the attacks on UN peacekeepers during the summer of 1993, the UN shifted its focus 
toward reprisals against Aideed and called for his arrest.  Raids against his caches and 
compounds resulted in civilian deaths and only served to strengthen his image in 
Somalis’ hearts and minds.  The UN’s strategy for attempting to deter Aideed as a spoiler 
changed from socialization to complete neutralization.  Regardless of the merits of this 
new strategy, UNOSOM II did not offer the credible threat of force to back it up.  The 
enforcement of disarmament as part of a wider political settlement may have been 
successful with UNITAF’s overwhelming military pressure, but not after Operation 
Restore Hope had ended.  As a result, Aideed came to consider the UN-sponsored peace 
process as a direct threat to his survival and he retreated completely from comprehensive 
negotiations.  Without effective enforcement, disarmament failed in Mogadishu and the 
hopes for a political settlement died.176   
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The Somalia case study provides a clear example of how coercive inducement, as 
a strategy to deter spoilers, backfires when a partial response from a peace enforcement 
operation alters the balance of power and thus elicits non-cooperation from the 
factions.177  By refusing to coordinate its mission with the political negotiations 
underway in Addis Ababa, UNITAF attempted to preserve its neutrality at the cost of the 
wider UN intervention.  When UNOSOM II later tried to conduct disarmament, as called 
for under Addis Ababa II, its military weakness and lack of credibility led to escalated 
fighting in Mogadishu and no disarmament.  The UN’s role as mediator in the conflict 
was irrevocably compromised by UNOSOM II’s disproportionate reprisals against 
Aideed, leading to the UN’s complete withdrawal from Somalia by 1995.  Alternatively, 
a workable solution could have been continued UN mediation toward a political 
settlement, reinforced by a peace enforcement operation led by a strong outside 
coalition.178  If UNITAF had been properly linked to the UN’s political negotiations, 
Operation Restore Hope could have provided a credible deterrent to Aideed.  Instead, 
Operation Restore Hope’s limited mandate, lack of coordination with the political 
negotiations in Addis Ababa I and II, and perceived partiality only served to strengthen 
the warlord spoilers instead of deterring them. 
Artemis proved its credibility in the eyes of the spoiler Lubanga by presenting a 
force with the military strength and willpower to undercut his ability to wage war in Ituri.  
As discussed above, Lubanga sought to maintain and expand his territorial control in Ituri 
in order to force his way into the political negotiations at the national level.  If the 
transitional government for the DRC or its constituent Ituri Interim Administration got 
underway, he would be permanently frozen out of a position of power in the post-conflict 
environment.  He had not been included in the negotiations in Kinshasa because he had 
not been a significant player in the balance of power between the warlords in 1999, when  
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the peace process began.  His refusal to disarm and withdraw from Bunia, and his 
propensity for confronting overwhelmed UN peacekeepers there, required a credible 
peace enforcement mission to deter him. 
Whereas MONUC had proven itself non-credible at deterring Lubanga, Artemis 
demonstrated its credibility by bringing sufficient resources to bear against him.  The 
IEMF’s logistical superiority, special forces, and close air support assets, as discussed in 
Chapter III, allowed Artemis to overwhelm Lubanga’s forces and force their retreat from 
Bunia.  Artemis also demonstrated its resolve to use force, when necessary, to handicap 
Lubanga’s military strengths by removing his weapons caches in the “weapons-free 
zone” around Bunia.  The European Union provided a coalition of forces that was clearly 
stronger than Lubanga’s militia, as well as committed to retaliating against his 
provocations – both key ingredients in an effective coercion strategy to deter spoilers.179  
In doing so, Artemis prevented Lubanga’s greedy spoiler tactics from impeding the 
establishment of the Ituri Interim Administration and the country’s progress toward an 
elected government.  His encroachments into the balance of power that had held sway 
during the political negotiations from 1999-2002 were effectively rebuffed, and his power 
base in Ituri undermined. 
Artemis’s credibility was enhanced by its coordination with the peace process.  
Bringing sufficient forces to bear at the wrong time and/or wrong place would have had 
no effect on deterring Lubanga or other spoilers.  Artemis concentrated specifically on 
Bunia, the capital of Ituri, in the summer of 2003 because this was a critical juncture in 
the entire peace process for the DRC.  The Luanda and Sun City agreements, to be 
implemented, required a stabilized Ituri.  Lubanga assaulted Bunia for that very reason, 
knowing that he could prevent the implementation of the agreements by impeding the 
Ituri Interim Administration.  If he had not been confronted effectively before the 
autumn, which was the earliest that MONUC could be properly reinforced to do so, he 
would have effectively spoiled progress toward a comprehensive political settlement to 
the conflict in the DRC.  The strength that Artemis demonstrated on the ground at this 
key point in time allowed for a turning point in the conflict – Bunia was stabilized and 
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MONUC had the breathing room it needed to regroup and form the Ituri Brigade to 
stabilize the rest of Ituri and Eastern DRC.  The consistent use of military pressure 
against spoilers is necessary to keep negotiations moving forward, and ratcheting that 
pressure up in the face of a specific challenge is an effective strategy for deterring 
them.180 Artemis provided that increased military pressure – a highly credible threat to 
Lubanga’s spoiling tactics – at a key juncture in the peace process, preventing him from 
irrevocably impeding its forward momentum. 
In both case studies, the strategy devised to deter spoilers to the peace process 
was weighted heavily toward coercion.  The UN deliberately excluded Lubanga from the 
power-sharing arrangement for the transitional government in the DRC due to his late 
arrival on the scene, when a political settlement had already been reached.  The UN also 
seemed unwilling or unable to negotiate effectively with Aideed using the carrot 
approach, and failed to conclude a political settlement endorsed by his faction.  Because 
of the lack of success with rewards or concessions, the weight of effort for deterring 
spoilers in these two cases rested with coercion.  Peace enforcement operations needed to 
be employed in a highly credible manner in order to force compliance with the terms of a 
political settlement or ongoing negotiations.  Only a strong peace enforcement mission 
could guarantee the implementation of the terms of political agreements, and stave off 
greedy spoilers like Aideed and Lubanga. 
Today, Somalia appears to be as badly – if not worse – off than it was in 1992.  
Operation Restore Hope provided a small window of humanitarian relief for the starving 
people of Southern Somalia.  Unfortunately, it failed to have any kind of lasting positive 
impact on the country, which remains plagued by malnutrition, displaced people, and 
catastrophic violence.  While the names of the warlords may have changed, the 
conditions that prevailed in 1992 are unaltered.  The suffering and deaths of the Somali 
people still stem from the brutal struggle for power between the warlords in Mogadishu 
and Southern Somalia.  Operation Restore Hope, by failing to connect its potentially 
credible peace enforcement mission to the political settlement process, failed to deter 
spoilers like Aideed.  Indeed, it accidentally strengthened them, and the endemic violence 
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in Somalia today is the result.  No progress toward a political settlement to the conflict 
has occurred in the last sixteen years, and the Somalis who have survived the violence 
appear resolved to export their war to the rest of the Horn of Africa. 
Operation Artemis, in contrast, provided highly credible peace enforcement, 
keeping the political settlements reached as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue on track 
despite spoiler provocations.  Today, while hardly an oasis of stability in Africa, the DRC 
continues to make progress toward peace.  Milestones in the peace process continue to be 
met, such as national elections in 2006.  MONUC remains in the East, dealing with 
pockets of continued resistance from various factions and warlords.  The DRC is not a 
role model for democracy or quality of life, but the chances of a Third Congo War are a 
lot more remote today than they were in 2003.  Because Artemis effectively deterred 
spoilers like Lubanga in Bunia, the political settlement to the conflict in the DRC endures 
and progress toward a lasting peace continues. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Throughout this paper, I have examined how the ability of a peace enforcement 
operation to deter spoilers affects progress toward a political settlement to a given 
conflict.  Interventions in the DRC and Somalia provide contrasting examples of success 
and failure in deterring spoilers, based on the strategy used in each case.  Can the lessons 
from these two cases be applied to the vast number of other civil conflicts in Africa, or 
the world?  I believe they can.  While unique conditions may have existed in these cases 
that either favored or detracted from Operations Artemis and Restore Hope, the 
overarching formula for success gleaned from these cases can be applied generally to 
other countries.  To effectively deter spoilers in a peace process, peace enforcement 
operations must be a credible threat to the spoilers, while at the same time intricately 
coordinated with the goals of the political settlement in progress. 
For a multitude of reasons, the United Nations is generally unable to provide a 
highly credible peace enforcement mission when it is most desperately needed to tackle a 
crisis point in the conflict resolution process.  It chronically suffers from a lack of troop 
contributions from its member states, command and control problems within the 
multinational force construct, and logistical shortfalls resulting in an extremely long 
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deployment timeline, to name just a few.  The UN is widely regarded as a legitimate 
mediator in civil and/or interstate conflicts, and has proven its dedication to bringing the 
parties to a conflict to the bargaining table in hopes of reaching a political settlement and 
ultimately ending the conflict.  The legitimacy needed to mediate a political agreement, 
however, can be different than that needed to enforce it once a spoiler emerges.  In peace 
enforcement operations, the most relevant form of legitimacy lies in the credibility of the 
mission.  While factions may consider a coalition peace enforcement operation somewhat 
more partial than a UN force, a capable operation will nonetheless be respected because 
of its military superiority.  Absent a major shift in the force generation and projection 
capabilities of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, this dynamic will 
prevail for the foreseeable future.  When operating under a UN mandate, coalition peace 
enforcement operations benefit from both the UN’s legitimacy and the coalition’s 
military effectiveness.  
In this light, the best option for a credible peace enforcement mission continues to 
be a Western-led coalition.  Both Artemis and Restore Hope proved that such a coalition 
can deploy within weeks, rather than months in the case of the UN, when a peace process 
is in danger of collapse.  Both operations also demonstrated how their superior military 
capabilities enabled them to complete their missions – while Restore Hope failed to deter 
Aideed, this was a question of mandate rather than capability.  UNOSOM II, even 
augmented with U.S. Special Operations Forces, could not project a force credible 
enough to deter Aideed.  Only with the resources available to European states or the U.S. 
could an operation like Artemis get underway, as demonstrated by the effectiveness of its 
logistics, special forces, and air support.  Western states are simply unwilling to 
relinquish such close-held resources to UN control, and the UN is too unwieldy to bring 
them to bear effectively.  If the Western member states of the United Nations are sincere 
about preserving political settlements to conflicts around the world, they must be willing 
to lead peace enforcement operations and commit their own troops and equipment.  
Ground truth indicates that a Western-led mission is taken more seriously by greedy 
spoilers like Aideed and Lubanga. 
Not every peace process will require such a strong force; some political 
settlements are strong enough to be maintained by a much lighter peacekeeping force.  
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There is a key decision point here for future operations, and it revolves around the 
emergence of a spoiler to a political settlement.  First, a peace enforcement mission must 
have a peace to enforce – without a political settlement in place before boots hit the 
ground, the mission’s mandate is open to interpretation and strong survival instincts 
impel the various factions to shape the changing security environment to their benefit.  
The act of introducing a heavily-armed force into a battlefield situation cannot help but 
sway the balance of power between factions.  Without a mutually agreed framework 
outlining a future end-state, as detailed in a concluded political settlement, spoilers may 
continue to resist what they view as an imposed peace agreement. 
Once a political settlement has been achieved, the interveners must determine 
whether or not an emerging spoiler constitutes an imminent threat to the peace process 
itself.  Lubanga, for example, directly threatened the implementation of the Luanda 
Accord and the establishment of legitimate political leadership in the form of the IIA and 
the transitional government.  The Spring of 2003 was a turning point in the peace process 
for the DRC, and the situation in Ituri had to be dealt with quickly and decisively in order 
to vouchsafe the political settlements of 2002.  In such a case, the rapid deployment of a 
credible peace enforcement mission may require a Western-led coalition, as described 
above.  In other types of cases, when potential spoilers can be effectively deterred by 
positive inducement or they do not constitute an existential threat to a political settlement, 
the UN peacekeepers already on the ground may suffice. 
These lessons for deterring spoilers and preserving a political settlement to a 
conflict are not currently being applied.  Despite the lack of a comprehensive political 
settlement in Darfur, the United Nations has committed thousands of troops to a new 
peace enforcement mission there.  The bulk of the mission consists of re-hatted African 
Union troops who have previously failed to demonstrate a credible threat to spoilers in 
Darfur.  Now, the various rebel factions, government-aligned factions, and the 
government in Khartoum all struggle to influence the course of any future political 
settlement while the UN mission is hopelessly impeded.  In this case, the UN is 
confronted with a spoiler to the peace process in the form of the current government.  The 
fact that its charter prohibits it from impinging on state sovereignty, thus restricting its 
70 
ability to tackle the government spoilers, means that the UN can provide neither a 
legitimate nor credible peace enforcement mission for Darfur.   
In Somalia, the UN is also considering taking over the African Union peace 
enforcement mission, also absent a political settlement that has the support of the 
strongest factions.  In both cases, an effective peace enforcement mission would require a 
credible force tied to a political settlement.  Both of these conditions must be met for a 
peace enforcement operation to be capable of deterring spoilers and thus maintaining the 
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